CVE-2025-21693 (GCVE-0-2025-21693)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2025-02-10 15:58
Modified
2026-08-05 11:53
Severity ?
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug In zswap_compress() and zswap_decompress(), the per-CPU acomp_ctx of the current CPU at the beginning of the operation is retrieved and used throughout. However, since neither preemption nor migration are disabled, it is possible that the operation continues on a different CPU. If the original CPU is hotunplugged while the acomp_ctx is still in use, we run into a UAF bug as some of the resources attached to the acomp_ctx are freed during hotunplug in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() (i.e. acomp_ctx.buffer, acomp_ctx.req, or acomp_ctx.acomp). The problem was introduced in commit 1ec3b5fe6eec ("mm/zswap: move to use crypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration") when the switch to the crypto_acomp API was made. Prior to that, the per-CPU crypto_comp was retrieved using get_cpu_ptr() which disables preemption and makes sure the CPU cannot go away from under us. Preemption cannot be disabled with the crypto_acomp API as a sleepable context is needed. Use the acomp_ctx.mutex to synchronize CPU hotplug callbacks allocating and freeing resources with compression/decompression paths. Make sure that acomp_ctx.req is NULL when the resources are freed. In the compression/decompression paths, check if acomp_ctx.req is NULL after acquiring the mutex (meaning the CPU was offlined) and retry on the new CPU. The initialization of acomp_ctx.mutex is moved from the CPU hotplug callback to the pool initialization where it belongs (where the mutex is allocated). In addition to adding clarity, this makes sure that CPU hotplug cannot reinitialize a mutex that is already locked by compression/decompression. Previously a fix was attempted by holding cpus_read_lock() [1]. This would have caused a potential deadlock as it is possible for code already holding the lock to fall into reclaim and enter zswap (causing a deadlock). A fix was also attempted using SRCU for synchronization, but Johannes pointed out that synchronize_srcu() cannot be used in CPU hotplug notifiers [2]. Alternative fixes that were considered/attempted and could have worked: - Refcounting the per-CPU acomp_ctx. This involves complexity in handling the race between the refcount dropping to zero in zswap_[de]compress() and the refcount being re-initialized when the CPU is onlined. - Disabling migration before getting the per-CPU acomp_ctx [3], but that's discouraged and is a much bigger hammer than needed, and could result in subtle performance issues. [1]https://lkml.kernel.org/20241219212437.2714151-1-yosryahmed@google.com/ [2]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107074724.1756696-2-yosryahmed@google.com/ [3]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107222236.2715883-2-yosryahmed@google.com/ [yosryahmed@google.com: remove comment]
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 1ec3b5fe6eec782f4e5e0a80e4ce1909ffd5d161
Version: 1ec3b5fe6eec782f4e5e0a80e4ce1909ffd5d161
 Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "LOW",
              "attackVector": "LOCAL",
              "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
              "baseScore": 7.8,
              "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
              "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
              "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
              "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
              "scope": "UNCHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "NONE",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
              "version": "3.1"
            }
          },
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2025-21693",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2025-02-10T17:10:07.856772Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "problemTypes": [
          {
            "descriptions": [
              {
                "cweId": "CWE-416",
                "description": "CWE-416 Use After Free",
                "lang": "en",
                "type": "CWE"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2025-02-10T17:11:03.608Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/zswap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "8d29ff5d50304daa41dc3cfdda4a9d1e46cf5be1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1ec3b5fe6eec782f4e5e0a80e4ce1909ffd5d161",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1ec3b5fe6eec782f4e5e0a80e4ce1909ffd5d161",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/zswap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.11"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.11",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.12",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.13",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.12",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.13",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug\n\nIn zswap_compress() and zswap_decompress(), the per-CPU acomp_ctx of the\ncurrent CPU at the beginning of the operation is retrieved and used\nthroughout.  However, since neither preemption nor migration are disabled,\nit is possible that the operation continues on a different CPU.\n\nIf the original CPU is hotunplugged while the acomp_ctx is still in use,\nwe run into a UAF bug as some of the resources attached to the acomp_ctx\nare freed during hotunplug in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() (i.e. \nacomp_ctx.buffer, acomp_ctx.req, or acomp_ctx.acomp).\n\nThe problem was introduced in commit 1ec3b5fe6eec (\"mm/zswap: move to use\ncrypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration\") when the switch to the\ncrypto_acomp API was made.  Prior to that, the per-CPU crypto_comp was\nretrieved using get_cpu_ptr() which disables preemption and makes sure the\nCPU cannot go away from under us.  Preemption cannot be disabled with the\ncrypto_acomp API as a sleepable context is needed.\n\nUse the acomp_ctx.mutex to synchronize CPU hotplug callbacks allocating\nand freeing resources with compression/decompression paths.  Make sure\nthat acomp_ctx.req is NULL when the resources are freed.  In the\ncompression/decompression paths, check if acomp_ctx.req is NULL after\nacquiring the mutex (meaning the CPU was offlined) and retry on the new\nCPU.\n\nThe initialization of acomp_ctx.mutex is moved from the CPU hotplug\ncallback to the pool initialization where it belongs (where the mutex is\nallocated).  In addition to adding clarity, this makes sure that CPU\nhotplug cannot reinitialize a mutex that is already locked by\ncompression/decompression.\n\nPreviously a fix was attempted by holding cpus_read_lock() [1].  This\nwould have caused a potential deadlock as it is possible for code already\nholding the lock to fall into reclaim and enter zswap (causing a\ndeadlock).  A fix was also attempted using SRCU for synchronization, but\nJohannes pointed out that synchronize_srcu() cannot be used in CPU hotplug\nnotifiers [2].\n\nAlternative fixes that were considered/attempted and could have worked:\n- Refcounting the per-CPU acomp_ctx. This involves complexity in\n  handling the race between the refcount dropping to zero in\n  zswap_[de]compress() and the refcount being re-initialized when the\n  CPU is onlined.\n- Disabling migration before getting the per-CPU acomp_ctx [3], but\n  that\u0027s discouraged and is a much bigger hammer than needed, and could\n  result in subtle performance issues.\n\n[1]https://lkml.kernel.org/20241219212437.2714151-1-yosryahmed@google.com/\n[2]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107074724.1756696-2-yosryahmed@google.com/\n[3]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107222236.2715883-2-yosryahmed@google.com/\n\n[yosryahmed@google.com: remove comment]"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The UAF is reached through local memory-management activity \u2014 `madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT)`/reclaim driving `zswap_store()`\u2192`zswap_compress()` and swap-in faults driving `zswap_load()`\u2192`zswap_decompress()` \u2014 raced against a local CPU offline transition (sysfs `cpuN/online`, suspend/resume, or hypervisor vCPU hot-remove). No remote peer or network input reaches `mm/zswap.c`.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls the zswap side (unbounded `MADV_PAGEOUT`/swap-in loops on threads pinned to each CPU via `sched_setaffinity()`), and the offline operation itself performs the migration that opens the window, since `CPUHP_MM_ZSWP_POOL_PREPARE` teardown runs only after the dying CPU\u0027s tasks have been pushed to other CPUs; the pre-fix per-CPU mutex additionally parks several attacker threads on the dying CPU\u0027s ctx so they all wake onto freed resources. Hotplug or suspend/resume cycles can be repeated indefinitely until the race lands, and zswap is a mainstream distro config (`CONFIG_ZSWAP`, `CONFIG_ZSWAP_DEFAULT_ON`).\nPR:L - The compress/decompress half needs no privilege at all \u2014 any user\u0027s own anonymous memory plus `madvise()` reaches it with no `capable()` check \u2014 and the offline half requires no elevated credentials in realistic deployments: the identical CPU-down sequence runs on every suspend/resume, which an unprivileged desktop/laptop/Android session can request via logind/polkit, and cloud guests (Xen vCPU availability, pseries DLPAR, s390, ACPI eject) and vendor Android hotplug governors offline CPUs autonomously while the attacker keeps zswap traffic in flight.\nUI:N - The attacker drives both the reclaim/swap-in traffic and the hotplug or suspend cycle itself; no victim action, mount, or file open is needed, and on hotplug-driven platforms the offline event occurs during normal operation.\nS:U - The freed `acomp_ctx` resources and the resulting corruption are entirely within the kernel\u0027s own memory and security authority, with no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\nC:H - `zswap_decompress()` memcpys into and then decompresses out of the freed 8 KB `acomp_ctx-\u003ebuffer`, writing the result into the folio returned to userspace by the swap-in fault, so a groomed reallocation of that slab object leaks arbitrary kernel data into an attacker-readable page; the freed `acomp_req`/`crypto_acomp` are also read as live objects.\nI:H - `crypto_acomp_compress()` expands to `crypto_acomp_reqtfm(req)-\u003ecompress(req)`, an indirect call through a function pointer loaded from the freed tfm, giving control-flow hijack after heap grooming; additionally the compressor writes up to `PAGE_SIZE * 2` of attacker-influenced output into the freed buffer and `acomp_request_set_params()` writes into the freed request.\nA:H - The use-after-free reliably oopses or panics the kernel, and `zswap_decompress()` carries two unconditional `BUG_ON()`s on the crypto result and `req-\u003edlen` that fire immediately on garbage from freed structures \u2014 the bug was reported precisely as a crash by both Johannes Weiner and Sam Sun."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:53:39.821Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d29ff5d50304daa41dc3cfdda4a9d1e46cf5be1"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65"
        }
      ],
      "title": "mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-21693",
    "datePublished": "2025-02-10T15:58:49.056Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-12-29T08:45:45.742Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:53:39.821Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\", \"integrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\"}}, {\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2025-21693\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"total\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2025-02-10T17:10:07.856772Z\"}}}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-416\", \"description\": \"CWE-416 Use After Free\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2025-02-10T17:10:20.821Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug\", \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 7.8, \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"AV:L - The UAF is reached through local memory-management activity \\u2014 `madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT)`/reclaim driving `zswap_store()`\\u2192`zswap_compress()` and swap-in faults driving `zswap_load()`\\u2192`zswap_decompress()` \\u2014 raced against a local CPU offline transition (sysfs `cpuN/online`, suspend/resume, or hypervisor vCPU hot-remove). No remote peer or network input reaches `mm/zswap.c`.\\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls the zswap side (unbounded `MADV_PAGEOUT`/swap-in loops on threads pinned to each CPU via `sched_setaffinity()`), and the offline operation itself performs the migration that opens the window, since `CPUHP_MM_ZSWP_POOL_PREPARE` teardown runs only after the dying CPU\u0027s tasks have been pushed to other CPUs; the pre-fix per-CPU mutex additionally parks several attacker threads on the dying CPU\u0027s ctx so they all wake onto freed resources. Hotplug or suspend/resume cycles can be repeated indefinitely until the race lands, and zswap is a mainstream distro config (`CONFIG_ZSWAP`, `CONFIG_ZSWAP_DEFAULT_ON`).\\nPR:L - The compress/decompress half needs no privilege at all \\u2014 any user\u0027s own anonymous memory plus `madvise()` reaches it with no `capable()` check \\u2014 and the offline half requires no elevated credentials in realistic deployments: the identical CPU-down sequence runs on every suspend/resume, which an unprivileged desktop/laptop/Android session can request via logind/polkit, and cloud guests (Xen vCPU availability, pseries DLPAR, s390, ACPI eject) and vendor Android hotplug governors offline CPUs autonomously while the attacker keeps zswap traffic in flight.\\nUI:N - The attacker drives both the reclaim/swap-in traffic and the hotplug or suspend cycle itself; no victim action, mount, or file open is needed, and on hotplug-driven platforms the offline event occurs during normal operation.\\nS:U - The freed `acomp_ctx` resources and the resulting corruption are entirely within the kernel\u0027s own memory and security authority, with no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\\nC:H - `zswap_decompress()` memcpys into and then decompresses out of the freed 8 KB `acomp_ctx-\u003ebuffer`, writing the result into the folio returned to userspace by the swap-in fault, so a groomed reallocation of that slab object leaks arbitrary kernel data into an attacker-readable page; the freed `acomp_req`/`crypto_acomp` are also read as live objects.\\nI:H - `crypto_acomp_compress()` expands to `crypto_acomp_reqtfm(req)-\u003ecompress(req)`, an indirect call through a function pointer loaded from the freed tfm, giving control-flow hijack after heap grooming; additionally the compressor writes up to `PAGE_SIZE * 2` of attacker-influenced output into the freed buffer and `acomp_request_set_params()` writes into the freed request.\\nA:H - The use-after-free reliably oopses or panics the kernel, and `zswap_decompress()` carries two unconditional `BUG_ON()`s on the crypto result and `req-\u003edlen` that fire immediately on garbage from freed structures \\u2014 the bug was reported precisely as a crash by both Johannes Weiner and Sam Sun.\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1ec3b5fe6eec782f4e5e0a80e4ce1909ffd5d161\", \"lessThan\": \"8d29ff5d50304daa41dc3cfdda4a9d1e46cf5be1\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1ec3b5fe6eec782f4e5e0a80e4ce1909ffd5d161\", \"lessThan\": \"12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"mm/zswap.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"5.11\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"5.11\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.12.12\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.12.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.13\", \"versionType\": \"original_commit_for_fix\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"*\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"mm/zswap.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"affected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d29ff5d50304daa41dc3cfdda4a9d1e46cf5be1\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12dcb0ef540629a281533f9dedc1b6b8e14cfb65\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"bippy-1.2.0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nmm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug\\n\\nIn zswap_compress() and zswap_decompress(), the per-CPU acomp_ctx of the\\ncurrent CPU at the beginning of the operation is retrieved and used\\nthroughout.  However, since neither preemption nor migration are disabled,\\nit is possible that the operation continues on a different CPU.\\n\\nIf the original CPU is hotunplugged while the acomp_ctx is still in use,\\nwe run into a UAF bug as some of the resources attached to the acomp_ctx\\nare freed during hotunplug in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() (i.e. \\nacomp_ctx.buffer, acomp_ctx.req, or acomp_ctx.acomp).\\n\\nThe problem was introduced in commit 1ec3b5fe6eec (\\\"mm/zswap: move to use\\ncrypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration\\\") when the switch to the\\ncrypto_acomp API was made.  Prior to that, the per-CPU crypto_comp was\\nretrieved using get_cpu_ptr() which disables preemption and makes sure the\\nCPU cannot go away from under us.  Preemption cannot be disabled with the\\ncrypto_acomp API as a sleepable context is needed.\\n\\nUse the acomp_ctx.mutex to synchronize CPU hotplug callbacks allocating\\nand freeing resources with compression/decompression paths.  Make sure\\nthat acomp_ctx.req is NULL when the resources are freed.  In the\\ncompression/decompression paths, check if acomp_ctx.req is NULL after\\nacquiring the mutex (meaning the CPU was offlined) and retry on the new\\nCPU.\\n\\nThe initialization of acomp_ctx.mutex is moved from the CPU hotplug\\ncallback to the pool initialization where it belongs (where the mutex is\\nallocated).  In addition to adding clarity, this makes sure that CPU\\nhotplug cannot reinitialize a mutex that is already locked by\\ncompression/decompression.\\n\\nPreviously a fix was attempted by holding cpus_read_lock() [1].  This\\nwould have caused a potential deadlock as it is possible for code already\\nholding the lock to fall into reclaim and enter zswap (causing a\\ndeadlock).  A fix was also attempted using SRCU for synchronization, but\\nJohannes pointed out that synchronize_srcu() cannot be used in CPU hotplug\\nnotifiers [2].\\n\\nAlternative fixes that were considered/attempted and could have worked:\\n- Refcounting the per-CPU acomp_ctx. This involves complexity in\\n  handling the race between the refcount dropping to zero in\\n  zswap_[de]compress() and the refcount being re-initialized when the\\n  CPU is onlined.\\n- Disabling migration before getting the per-CPU acomp_ctx [3], but\\n  that\u0027s discouraged and is a much bigger hammer than needed, and could\\n  result in subtle performance issues.\\n\\n[1]https://lkml.kernel.org/20241219212437.2714151-1-yosryahmed@google.com/\\n[2]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107074724.1756696-2-yosryahmed@google.com/\\n[3]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107222236.2715883-2-yosryahmed@google.com/\\n\\n[yosryahmed@google.com: remove comment]\"}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.12.12\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.11\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.13\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.11\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"shortName\": \"Linux\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-05T11:53:39.821Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2025-21693\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-05T11:53:39.821Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2024-12-29T08:45:45.742Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"datePublished\": \"2025-02-10T15:58:49.056Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Linux\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.