CVE-2024-53179 (GCVE-0-2024-53179)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-12-27 13:49
Modified
2026-08-05 11:44
Severity ?
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-after-free of signing key Customers have reported use-after-free in @ses->auth_key.response with SMB2.1 + sign mounts which occurs due to following race: task A task B cifs_mount() dfs_mount_share() get_session() cifs_mount_get_session() cifs_send_recv() cifs_get_smb_ses() compound_send_recv() cifs_setup_session() smb2_setup_request() kfree_sensitive() smb2_calc_signature() crypto_shash_setkey() *UAF* Fix this by ensuring that we have a valid @ses->auth_key.response by checking whether @ses->ses_status is SES_GOOD or SES_EXITING with @ses->ses_lock held. After commit 24a9799aa8ef ("smb: client: fix UAF in smb2_reconnect_server()"), we made sure to call ->logoff() only when @ses was known to be good (e.g. valid ->auth_key.response), so it's safe to access signing key when @ses->ses_status == SES_EXITING.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 32811d242ff6f28da2ab18c90a15e32fd958e774
Version: 32811d242ff6f28da2ab18c90a15e32fd958e774
Version: 32811d242ff6f28da2ab18c90a15e32fd958e774
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