CVE-2024-35889 (GCVE-0-2024-35889)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-05-19 08:34
Modified
2026-08-05 11:30
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: fix kernel panic on unknown packet types In the very rare case where a packet type is unknown to the driver, idpf_rx_process_skb_fields would return early without calling eth_type_trans to set the skb protocol / the network layer handler. This is especially problematic if tcpdump is running when such a packet is received, i.e. it would cause a kernel panic. Instead, call eth_type_trans for every single packet, even when the packet type is unknown.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 3a8845af66edb340ba9210bb8a0da040c7d6e590
Version: 3a8845af66edb340ba9210bb8a0da040c7d6e590
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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
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