CVE-2024-26830 (GCVE-0-2024-26830)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-04-17 09:43
Modified
2026-08-05 11:27
Severity ?
8.4 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC Currently when PF administratively sets VF's MAC address and the VF is put down (VF tries to delete all MACs) then the MAC is removed from MAC filters and primary VF MAC is zeroed. Do not allow untrusted VF to remove primary MAC when it was set administratively by PF. Reproducer: 1) Create VF 2) Set VF interface up 3) Administratively set the VF's MAC 4) Put VF interface down [root@host ~]# echo 1 > /sys/class/net/enp2s0f0/device/sriov_numvfs [root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0v0 up [root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0 vf 0 mac fe:6c:b5:da:c7:7d [root@host ~]# ip link show enp2s0f0 23: enp2s0f0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000 link/ether 3c:ec:ef:b7:dd:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff vf 0 link/ether fe:6c:b5:da:c7:7d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff, spoof checking on, link-state auto, trust off [root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0v0 down [root@host ~]# ip link show enp2s0f0 23: enp2s0f0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000 link/ether 3c:ec:ef:b7:dd:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff vf 0 link/ether 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff, spoof checking on, link-state auto, trust off
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 700bbf6c1f9e4ab055528d5ab4ac5815fe4a6c1b
Version: 700bbf6c1f9e4ab055528d5ab4ac5815fe4a6c1b
Version: 700bbf6c1f9e4ab055528d5ab4ac5815fe4a6c1b
Version: 700bbf6c1f9e4ab055528d5ab4ac5815fe4a6c1b
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  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.