CVE-2020-15134 (GCVE-0-2020-15134)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2020-07-31 17:40
Modified
2024-08-04 13:08
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
Summary
Faye before version 1.4.0, there is a lack of certification validation in TLS handshakes. Faye uses em-http-request and faye-websocket in the Ruby version of its client. Those libraries both use the `EM::Connection#start_tls` method in EventMachine to implement the TLS handshake whenever a `wss:` URL is used for the connection. This method does not implement certificate verification by default, meaning that it does not check that the server presents a valid and trusted TLS certificate for the expected hostname. That means that any `https:` or `wss:` connection made using these libraries is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, since it does not confirm the identity of the server it is connected to. The first request a Faye client makes is always sent via normal HTTP, but later messages may be sent via WebSocket. Therefore it is vulnerable to the same problem that these underlying libraries are, and we needed both libraries to support TLS verification before Faye could claim to do the same. Your client would still be insecure if its initial HTTPS request was verified, but later WebSocket connections were not. This is fixed in Faye v1.4.0, which enables verification by default. For further background information on this issue, please see the referenced GitHub Advisory.
References
| URL | Tags | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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