BREW-TRAVIS-CVE-2025-59830 (GHSA-625H-95R8-8XPM)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:44 – Updated: 2026-08-13 17:44 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Rack has an unsafe default in Rack::QueryParser allows params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters
Details

Summary

Rack::QueryParser in version < 2.2.18 enforces its params_limit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.

Details

The issue arises because Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string counts only & characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n splits on both & and ;. This mismatch means that queries using ; separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing params_limit to be bypassed.

Other safeguards (bytesize_limit and key_space_limit) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.

Impact

Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.

Rack::Request, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses QueryParser in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered low, with the impact limited to edge cases where QueryParser is used directly.

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both & and ; are counted consistently toward params_limit.
  • If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure QueryParser with an explicit delimiter (e.g., &) to avoid the mismatch.
  • As a general precaution, enforce query string and request size limits at the web server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx, Apache, or a CDN) to mitigate excessive parsing overhead.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "rack",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:gem/rack@3.0.11",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.2.18"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "travis",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/travis"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.0_2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "key": "pkg:gem/rack@3.0.11",
        "name": "rack",
        "resource": "rack",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "3.0.11"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Rack::QueryParser` in version `\u003c 2.2.18` enforces its `params_limit` only for parameters separated by `\u0026`, while still splitting on both `\u0026` and `;`. As a result, attackers could use `;` separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.\n\n## Details\n\nThe issue arises because `Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string` counts only `\u0026` characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex `DEFAULT_SEP = /[\u0026;] */n` splits on both `\u0026` and `;`. This mismatch means that queries using `;` separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing `params_limit` to be bypassed.\n\nOther safeguards (`bytesize_limit` and `key_space_limit`) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications or middleware that directly invoke `Rack::QueryParser` with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.\n\n`Rack::Request`, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses `QueryParser` in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered **low**, with the impact limited to edge cases where `QueryParser` is used directly.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both `\u0026` and `;` are counted consistently toward `params_limit`.\n* If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure `QueryParser` with an explicit delimiter (e.g., `\u0026`) to avoid the mismatch.\n* As a general precaution, enforce query string and request size limits at the web server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx, Apache, or a CDN) to mitigate excessive parsing overhead.",
  "id": "BREW-travis-CVE-2025-59830",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:44:53Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:44:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-625h-95r8-8xpm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59830"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/54e4ffdd5affebcb0c015cc6ae74635c0831ed71"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rack has an unsafe default in Rack::QueryParser allows params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-625h-95r8-8xpm",
    "CVE-2025-59830"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.