BREW-AIDER-CVE-2026-114501 (GHSA-654X-CWWV-5J9C)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:58 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:58 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Pillow: Arrow export leaks stale heap memory when PILLOW_ALIGNMENT > 1
Details

Summary

When PILLOW_ALIGNMENT is set above 1, exporting an image to Arrow returns uninitialized heap memory mixed in with the pixel data. That memory can include pixels from images the process freed earlier.

Details

With an alignment above 1, the default allocator pads each row up to aligned_linesize and starts the first row at an aligned offset into the block. It then exports im->blocks[0].ptr as xsize * ysize tightly packed pixels, so exported data includes the padding bytes, and can include a few bytes from before the first row.

Tested vulnerable on 11.2.1, 12.3.0, 4c1ed27a5.

PoC

Whether things leak may depend on allocator configuration. This does show a leak on my Mac.

import os

os.environ["PILLOW_ALIGNMENT"] = "64"

from PIL import Image

# Image A: 64 px wide, so its rows fill the whole aligned stride
a = Image.new("L", (64, 40), 0x41).transpose(Image.Transpose.FLIP_LEFT_RIGHT)
del a

# Image B: 61 px wide, so each row has 3 bytes of padding; its pixels are all 0
b = Image.new("L", (61, 40), 0).transpose(Image.Transpose.FLIP_LEFT_RIGHT)

try:
    exported = Image.fromarrow(b, b.mode, b.size).tobytes()
except ValueError as e:
    print("Not vulnerable:", e)
else:
    if leaked := len(exported) - exported.count(0):
        raise RuntimeError(f"{leaked} of {len(exported)} exported bytes are not B's pixels")

Impact

Information disclosure for applications that set PILLOW_ALIGNMENT and export images to Arrow. Likely any image whose row length isn't a multiple of the alignment will do. In a service handling several users' images, one user's exported data can contain pixels from another user's image, or other stale heap contents.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "pillow",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pillow@12.1.1",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "13.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "aider",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.86.1_1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/pillow@12.1.1",
        "name": "pillow",
        "resource": "pillow",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "12.1.1"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen [`PILLOW_ALIGNMENT`](https://pillow.readthedocs.io/en/stable/reference/block_allocator.html#memory-pools) is set above 1, exporting an image to Arrow returns uninitialized heap memory mixed in with the pixel data. That memory can include pixels from images the process freed earlier. \n\n### Details\n\nWith an alignment above 1, the default allocator pads each row up to `aligned_linesize` and starts the first row at an aligned offset into the block. It then exports `im-\u003eblocks[0].ptr` as `xsize * ysize` tightly packed pixels, so exported data includes the padding bytes, and can include a few bytes from before the first row.\n\nTested vulnerable on 11.2.1, 12.3.0, 4c1ed27a5.\n\n### PoC\n\nWhether things leak may depend on allocator configuration. This does show a leak on my Mac.\n\n```python\nimport os\n\nos.environ[\"PILLOW_ALIGNMENT\"] = \"64\"\n\nfrom PIL import Image\n\n# Image A: 64 px wide, so its rows fill the whole aligned stride\na = Image.new(\"L\", (64, 40), 0x41).transpose(Image.Transpose.FLIP_LEFT_RIGHT)\ndel a\n\n# Image B: 61 px wide, so each row has 3 bytes of padding; its pixels are all 0\nb = Image.new(\"L\", (61, 40), 0).transpose(Image.Transpose.FLIP_LEFT_RIGHT)\n\ntry:\n    exported = Image.fromarrow(b, b.mode, b.size).tobytes()\nexcept ValueError as e:\n    print(\"Not vulnerable:\", e)\nelse:\n    if leaked := len(exported) - exported.count(0):\n        raise RuntimeError(f\"{leaked} of {len(exported)} exported bytes are not B\u0027s pixels\")\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nInformation disclosure for applications that set `PILLOW_ALIGNMENT` and export images to Arrow. Likely any image whose row length isn\u0027t a multiple of the alignment will do. In a service handling several users\u0027 images, one user\u0027s exported data can contain pixels from another user\u0027s image, or other stale heap contents.",
  "id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-114501",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T21:58:11Z",
  "published": "2026-10-29T21:58:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-654x-cwwv-5j9c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114501"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/10172"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/19f64946eb247b973dd4560be7dea3bf979d2e6a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pillow: Arrow export leaks stale heap memory when PILLOW_ALIGNMENT \u003e 1",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-654x-cwwv-5j9c",
    "BIT-pillow-2026-114501",
    "CVE-2026-114501",
    "PYSEC-2026-4336"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.