BREW-AIDER-CVE-2026-112405 (GHSA-CP9V-662Q-VVX9)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 09:13 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:58 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Pillow: NULL pointer dereference in Image.merge via an unvalidated band 0
Details

Summary

Image.merge() checks the mode of every input band except band 0. If band 0 is a single-band I or F image, the native merge routine reads a pixel pointer that is NULL for those modes and the process crashes. The IPTC plugin reaches this from a plain Image.open() followed by a load, and IPTC has no magic-byte prefilter, so a crafted file with no recognizable header can drive it.

Details

The validation loop skips band 0:

  • src/PIL/Image.py:3795 iterates for band in bands[1:] and checks mode and size only for those.

For an I or F image the 8-bit plane image8 is NULL (only image32 is set). ImagingMerge dereferences bands[0]->image8[y] for the multi-band output modes:

  • src/libImaging/Bands.c:302, :311, :321

The IPTC loader builds the band list from an attacker-typed sub-image and passes it to merge with the sub-image at index 0:

  • src/PIL/IptcImagePlugin.py:156-160
  • src/PIL/IptcImagePlugin.py:169 registers the opener with no accept function.

PoC

from PIL import Image

# Band 0 is a single-band "I" image: its image8 plane is NULL. merge() validates only
# bands[1:], so the native ImagingMerge dereferences the NULL plane for band 0.
band0 = Image.new("I", (4, 4))
Image.merge("RGB", [band0, Image.new("L", (4, 4)), Image.new("L", (4, 4))])

Run it:

$ python 02_poc.py
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

Observed on a source build of commit 3e2ab96.

Under AddressSanitizer:

==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000
    #0 ImagingMerge   src/libImaging/Bands.c:311
    #1 _merge         src/_imaging.c:2492
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/libImaging/Bands.c:311 in ImagingMerge

The null address confirms the dereference of the missing image8 plane for band 0.

Impact

NULL pointer dereference in a C extension. A crafted file opened and loaded through the IPTC path crashes the worker process. This is a hard crash, not a Python exception an application can catch.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "pillow",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pillow@12.1.1",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "13.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "aider",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.86.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/pillow@12.1.1",
        "name": "pillow",
        "resource": "pillow",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "12.1.1"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`Image.merge()` checks the mode of every input band except band 0. If band 0 is a single-band `I` or `F` image, the native merge routine reads a pixel pointer that is NULL for those modes and the process crashes. The IPTC plugin reaches this from a plain `Image.open()` followed by a load, and IPTC has no magic-byte prefilter, so a crafted file with no recognizable header can drive it.\n\n### Details\nThe validation loop skips band 0:\n\n- `src/PIL/Image.py:3795` iterates `for band in bands[1:]` and checks mode and size only for those.\n\nFor an `I` or `F` image the 8-bit plane `image8` is NULL (only `image32` is set). `ImagingMerge` dereferences `bands[0]-\u003eimage8[y]` for the multi-band output modes:\n\n- `src/libImaging/Bands.c:302`, `:311`, `:321`\n\nThe IPTC loader builds the band list from an attacker-typed sub-image and passes it to merge with the sub-image at index 0:\n\n- `src/PIL/IptcImagePlugin.py:156-160`\n- `src/PIL/IptcImagePlugin.py:169` registers the opener with no accept function.\n\n### PoC\n```python\nfrom PIL import Image\n\n# Band 0 is a single-band \"I\" image: its image8 plane is NULL. merge() validates only\n# bands[1:], so the native ImagingMerge dereferences the NULL plane for band 0.\nband0 = Image.new(\"I\", (4, 4))\nImage.merge(\"RGB\", [band0, Image.new(\"L\", (4, 4)), Image.new(\"L\", (4, 4))])\n```\n\nRun it:\n```\n$ python 02_poc.py\nSegmentation fault (core dumped)\n```\n\nObserved on a source build of commit `3e2ab96`.\n\nUnder AddressSanitizer:\n```\n==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000\n    #0 ImagingMerge   src/libImaging/Bands.c:311\n    #1 _merge         src/_imaging.c:2492\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/libImaging/Bands.c:311 in ImagingMerge\n```\nThe null address confirms the dereference of the missing `image8` plane for band 0.\n\n### Impact\nNULL pointer dereference in a C extension. A crafted file opened and loaded through the IPTC path crashes the worker process. This is a hard crash, not a Python exception an application can catch.",
  "id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-112405",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T21:58:11Z",
  "published": "2026-10-22T09:13:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-cp9v-662q-vvx9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112405"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/b6ee66e8b2c2c0932bdf65f963268d9f2927ef86"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pillow: NULL pointer dereference in Image.merge via an unvalidated band 0",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-cp9v-662q-vvx9",
    "CVE-2026-112405",
    "BIT-pillow-2026-112405",
    "PYSEC-2026-4333"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.