CVE-2026-99317 (GCVE-0-2026-99317)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 08:42 – Updated: 2026-11-19 13:52
VLAI
Title
ALSA: hwdep: Serialize DSP load requests
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hwdep: Serialize DSP load requests The check of the loaded DSP indices and the call of the driver's dsp_load callback in snd_hwdep_dsp_load() are not serialized. A hwdep file descriptor can be shared among threads, or inherited across fork, so two SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_DSP_LOAD requests for the same index can both observe the index as unloaded and enter the driver's callback concurrently, even though the device itself is opened exclusively. This breaks the assumption behind hw->dsp_loaded that a firmware index is loaded only once. For example, snd-usb-usx2y hits WARN_ON(usx2y->as04.buffer) in usx2y_async_seq04_init() and may allocate the US-428 sequence URBs twice. Serialize the check, the callback invocation and the bookkeeping with a per-hwdep mutex, so that the second request returns -EBUSY.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 200bda52a9fd604e13c57d3a548639c13bdfb19c (git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 3634a1beb0395f02807d41a2edf4288732d3f90e (git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 1b94ca29b1edbbdb357c2c8a9163d1d1755e4ad2 (git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < aee83c204f80d56b4d55f53acdb8594308ddcd4a (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 2.6.12
Unaffected: 0 , < 2.6.12 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.118 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.64 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.3.5 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.4-rc2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/sound/hwdep.h",
            "sound/core/hwdep.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "200bda52a9fd604e13c57d3a548639c13bdfb19c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3634a1beb0395f02807d41a2edf4288732d3f90e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1b94ca29b1edbbdb357c2c8a9163d1d1755e4ad2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "aee83c204f80d56b4d55f53acdb8594308ddcd4a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/sound/hwdep.h",
            "sound/core/hwdep.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.12"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.12",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.118",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
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              "cpeMatch": [
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                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.118",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "2.6.12",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.64",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "2.6.12",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "2.6.12",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.4-rc2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "2.6.12",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
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        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: hwdep: Serialize DSP load requests\n\nThe check of the loaded DSP indices and the call of the driver\u0027s\ndsp_load callback in snd_hwdep_dsp_load() are not serialized.  A hwdep\nfile descriptor can be shared among threads, or inherited across fork,\nso two SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_DSP_LOAD requests for the same index can both\nobserve the index as unloaded and enter the driver\u0027s callback\nconcurrently, even though the device itself is opened exclusively.\n\nThis breaks the assumption behind hw-\u003edsp_loaded that a firmware index\nis loaded only once.  For example, snd-usb-usx2y hits\nWARN_ON(usx2y-\u003eas04.buffer) in usx2y_async_seq04_init() and may\nallocate the US-428 sequence URBs twice.\n\nSerialize the check, the callback invocation and the bookkeeping with a\nper-hwdep mutex, so that the second request returns -EBUSY."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The patched snd_hwdep_dsp_load is reached from snd_hwdep_ioctl\u0027s SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_DSP_LOAD on the local hwdep node (/dev/snd/hwC*D*), via snd_hwdep_dsp_load_user. The only driver callback is snd_usx2y_hwdep_dsp_load; the colliding index and image come from that ioctl, not from a remote protocol message.\nAC:L - A local holder of one hwdep fd (exclusive=1 still allows threads and fork to share it) issues two DSP_LOAD ioctls for index 1 while hw-\u003edsp_loaded is clear, which the attacker gets by opening the node before usx2yloader or by replugging the US-x2y. Both calls pass the unlocked dsp_loaded test and run snd_usx2y_hwdep_dsp_load together.\nPR:L - snd_hwdep_open and snd_hwdep_ioctl contain no capable() check. udev grants the active session ACL on SUBSYSTEM==\"sound\" (uaccess, group audio), so an ordinary logged-in user can open the hwdep node and issue DSP_LOAD.\nUI:N - The attacker opens the fd and fires both SNDRV_HWDEP_IOCTL_DSP_LOAD calls. Firmware loading and replug, if needed to clear dsp_loaded, are the attacker\u0027s own actions.\nS:U - Impact stays inside the host kernel the caller is already running in: usx2ydev, its URBs, and the snd_card device list. No guest/host or IOMMU boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Both USB_ID_US224 and USB_ID_US428 loads call usx2y_rate_set, which kfrees the snd_usx2y_urb_seq still linked from usx2y-\u003eus04 while i_usx2y_in04_int passes us04-\u003eurb[] to usb_submit_urb. After reclaim, that urb pointer is attacker-controlled and usb_submit_urb dereferences it.\nI:H - i_usx2y_in04_int increments us04-\u003esubmitted and usb_submit_urb writes urb-\u003estatus, urb-\u003ehcpriv and the endpoint queue through the reclaimed us04-\u003eurb pointer. On USB_ID_US428 the second usx2y_audio_stream_new also stores pointers past usx2y-\u003esubs[4] into prepare_subs and prepare_wait_queue.\nA:H - The freed us04 URB is used in interrupt context, snd_device_new list_add races on card-\u003edevices from concurrent usx2y_create_alsa_devices, and wait_event runs on the overwritten prepare_wait_queue. Any of those oopses or livelocks the kernel; usx2y_async_seq04_init\u0027s WARN_ON(as04.buffer) is the same race when the second call loses."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T13:52:53.350Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/200bda52a9fd604e13c57d3a548639c13bdfb19c"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3634a1beb0395f02807d41a2edf4288732d3f90e"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b94ca29b1edbbdb357c2c8a9163d1d1755e4ad2"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aee83c204f80d56b4d55f53acdb8594308ddcd4a"
        }
      ],
      "title": "ALSA: hwdep: Serialize DSP load requests",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
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  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-99317",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-18T08:42:09.208Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.407Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T13:52:53.350Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-99317",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00187",
      "percentile": "0.08393"
    },
    "microsoft_vex": {
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-19T01:06:29.000Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-99317",
      "id": "msrc_CVE-2026-99317",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-11-18T22:17:39.000Z",
      "product_status:known_affected": "1",
      "product_status:under_investigation": "1",
      "source": "Microsoft CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "ALSA: hwdep: Serialize DSP load requests",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-99317.json",
      "version": "2"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-19T16:41:46+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-99317",
      "id": "CVE-2026-99317",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-11-18T08:42:09.208000+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "190",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "14",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via race condition in ALSA hwdep DSP loader",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-99317.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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