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CVE-2026-59890 (GCVE-0-2026-59890)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-08 16:02 – Updated: 2026-07-08 16:44| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advis… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0 | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| pypa | setuptools |
Affected:
< 83.0.0
|
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BREW-SIP-CVE-2026-59890 (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:34 – Updated: 2026-10-29 23:30 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
{
"affected": [
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"fix": "bump",
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"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
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}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-sip-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-29T23:30:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:34:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
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"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
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"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
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"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
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"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
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"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-SNAPCRAFT-CVE-2026-59890 (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:35 – Updated: 2026-10-13 23:33 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "84.0.0"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-snapcraft-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-13T23:33:12Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:35:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-SNOWFLAKE-CLI-CVE-2… (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:35 – Updated: 2026-10-23 09:08 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@84.0.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "snowflake-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/snowflake-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.4.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.30.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@84.0.0",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "84.0.0"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-snowflake-cli-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-23T09:08:35Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:35:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-STANDARDEBOOKS-CVE-… (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:41 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:38 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@83.0.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "standardebooks",
"purl": "pkg:brew/standardebooks"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.2"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@83.0.0",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "83.0.0"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-standardebooks-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:38:08Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:41:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-TERMINATOR-CVE-2026-59890 (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:43 – Updated: 2026-10-08 00:29 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "terminator",
"purl": "pkg:brew/terminator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "80.9.0"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-terminator-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-08T00:29:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:43:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-TERN-CVE-2026-59890 (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:43 – Updated: 2026-10-08 01:01 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "tern",
"purl": "pkg:brew/tern"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "80.9.0"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-tern-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-08T01:01:49Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:43:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-UNOCONV-CVE-2026-59890 (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:46 – Updated: 2026-10-07 22:58 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "unoconv",
"purl": "pkg:brew/unoconv"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.0_3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "80.9.0"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-unoconv-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-07T22:58:19Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:46:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-URH-CVE-2026-59890 (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:46 – Updated: 2026-10-08 00:15 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "urh",
"purl": "pkg:brew/urh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@80.9.0",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "80.9.0"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-urh-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-08T00:15:47Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:46:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
BREW-YAMLFIX-CVE-2026-59890 (GHSA-H35F-9H28-MQ5C)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:54 – Updated: 2026-10-26 11:25 – Source websiteSummary
When building a source distribution (python -m build --sdist / setup.py sdist), setuptools' FileList applies MANIFEST.in directives (exclude, global-exclude, recursive-exclude, prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a MANIFEST.in rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the .tar.gz and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.
Details
File names in FileList.files come from os.walk (setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py, _find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the MANIFEST.in pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:
# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)
def global_exclude(self, pattern):
match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD
return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names
A rule written NFC (café = 63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café = 63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.
A unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...) helper exists in setuptools/unicode_utils.py (decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, uses filesys_decode (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing SOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.
Impact
MANIFEST.in exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.
Proof of concept
With a project containing MANIFEST.in:
global-include *.txt *.json
global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC
and an on-disk file secret_café.txt written in NFD, python -m build --sdist packs the secret file into the resulting .tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.
Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each MANIFEST.in pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList) and the vendored setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that MANIFEST.in matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.
Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@84.2.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "83.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "yamlfix",
"purl": "pkg:brew/yamlfix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.19.1_2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@84.2.1",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "84.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools\u0027 `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.\n\n## Details\n\nFile names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author\u0027s editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:\n\n```python\n# setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude)\ndef global_exclude(self, pattern):\n match = translate_pattern(os.path.join(\u0027**\u0027, pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -\u003e regex, no NFC/NFD\n return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names\n```\n\nA rule written NFC (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`caf\u00e9` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.\n\nA `unicodedata.normalize(\u0027NFD\u0027, ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes\u2192str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred.\n\n## Impact\n\n`MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule \u2014 an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nWith a project containing `MANIFEST.in`:\n\n```\nglobal-include *.txt *.json\nglobal-exclude secret_caf\u00e9.txt # rule saved NFC\n```\n\nand an on-disk file `secret_caf\u00e9.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped \u2014 isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.",
"id": "BREW-yamlfix-CVE-2026-59890",
"modified": "2026-10-26T11:25:19Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:54:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/setuptools/PYSEC-2026-3447.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v83.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c",
"BIT-setuptools-2026-59890",
"CVE-2026-59890",
"PYSEC-2026-3447"
]
}
CERTFR-2026-AVI-0873
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2026-07-15 - Updated: 2026-07-15
De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans Microsoft Azure Linux. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer un problème de sécurité non spécifié par l'éditeur.
Solutions
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 libXfont2 2.0.6-1 versions antérieures à 2.0.8-1 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 telegraf 1.31.0-23 versions antérieures à 1.31.0-25 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 clamav 1.5.2-3 versions antérieures à 1.5.3-1 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 glib 2.78.6-9 versions antérieures à 2.78.6-10 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 mtr 0.95-3 versions antérieures à 0.95-4 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 xorg-x11-server-Xwayland 24.1.12-1 versions antérieures à 24.1.13-1 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 python-msgpack 1.0.5-2 versions antérieures à 1.0.5-3 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 curl 8.11.1-9 versions antérieures à 8.11.1-10 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 erlang 26.2.5.21-2 versions antérieures à 26.2.5.21-3 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 openssh 9.8p1-8 versions antérieures à 9.8p1-9 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 python-setuptools 69.0.3-5 versions antérieures à 69.0.3-6 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 nodejs 24.17.0-1 versions antérieures à 24.17.0-2 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 vim 9.2.0735-1 versions antérieures à 9.2.0782-1 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 keras 3.3.3-7 versions antérieures à 3.3.3-8 | ||
| Microsoft | Azure Linux | azl3 perl-DBI 1.643-5 versions antérieures à 1.650-1 |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "azl3 libXfont2 2.0.6-1 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 2.0.8-1",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 telegraf 1.31.0-23 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.31.0-25",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 clamav 1.5.2-3 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.5.3-1",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 glib 2.78.6-9 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 2.78.6-10",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 mtr 0.95-3 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 0.95-4",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 xorg-x11-server-Xwayland 24.1.12-1 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 24.1.13-1",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 python-msgpack 1.0.5-2 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.0.5-3",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 curl 8.11.1-9 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 8.11.1-10",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 erlang 26.2.5.21-2 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 26.2.5.21-3",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 openssh 9.8p1-8 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 9.8p1-9",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 python-setuptools 69.0.3-5 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 69.0.3-6",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 nodejs 24.17.0-1 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 24.17.0-2",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 vim 9.2.0735-1 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 9.2.0782-1",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 keras 3.3.3-7 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 3.3.3-8",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "azl3 perl-DBI 1.643-5 versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.650-1",
"product": {
"name": "Azure Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": "",
"content": "## Solutions\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2026-14380",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-14380"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-14461",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-14461"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-59996",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59996"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-59995",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59995"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-59999",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59999"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-20216",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20216"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-58013",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58013"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-8926",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-8926"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-20243",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20243"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-8458",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-8458"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-14739",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-14739"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-58015",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58015"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-56000",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-56000"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-58014",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58014"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-20215",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20215"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-58012",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58012"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-59890",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-10536",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-10536"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-20213",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20213"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-8932",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-8932"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-11525",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-11525"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-59997",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59997"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-58010",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58010"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-12064",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12064"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-12480",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12480"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-20214",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20214"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-60002",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60002"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-9079",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-9079"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-56003",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-56003"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-59856",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59856"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-20217",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20217"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-58011",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58011"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-58016",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58016"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-60001",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60001"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-14740",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-14740"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-20244",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-20244"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-57585",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-57585"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-8927",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-8927"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-60000",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60000"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-54908",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-54908"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-56002",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-56002"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-54886",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-54886"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-56001",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-56001"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-8286",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-8286"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2026-07-15T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2026-07-15T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTFR-2026-AVI-0873",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "Version initiale",
"revision_date": "2026-07-15T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Non sp\u00e9cifi\u00e9 par l\u0027\u00e9diteur"
}
],
"summary": "De multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes dans Microsoft Azure Linux. Elles permettent \u00e0 un attaquant de provoquer un probl\u00e8me de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 non sp\u00e9cifi\u00e9 par l\u0027\u00e9diteur.",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Microsoft Azure Linux",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": "2026-07-01",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-58013",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58013"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-9079",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-9079"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-56001",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-56001"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-20243",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20243"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-60001",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-60001"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-20214",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20214"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-8927",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-8927"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-20216",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20216"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-54908",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54908"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-01",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-58011",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58011"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-01",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-58012",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58012"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-8926",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-8926"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-59997",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59997"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-56002",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-56002"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-60002",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-60002"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-8932",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-8932"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-03",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-57585",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-57585"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-12064",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-12064"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-20215",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20215"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-56000",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-56000"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-56003",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-56003"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-14380",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-14380"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-01",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-58014",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58014"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-8286",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-8286"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-01",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-58015",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58015"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-8458",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-8458"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-06-27",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-11525",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-11525"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-59996",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59996"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-04",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-10536",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-10536"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-20213",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20213"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-59999",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59999"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-59995",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59995"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-20244",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20244"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-14740",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-14740"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-14461",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-14461"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-01",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-58016",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58016"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-07",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-12480",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-12480"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-01",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-58010",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58010"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-59856",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59856"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-09",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-60000",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-60000"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-14739",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-14739"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-07",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-54886",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54886"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-59890",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59890"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft Azure Linux CVE-2026-20217",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20217"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.