CVE-2026-42769 (GCVE-0-2026-42769)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-09 16:03 – Updated: 2026-06-10 07:48- CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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