CVE-2025-68294 (GCVE-0-2025-68294)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-16 15:06 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:10
VLAI
Title
io_uring/net: ensure vectored buffer node import is tied to notification
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/net: ensure vectored buffer node import is tied to notification When support for vectored registered buffers was added, the import itself is using 'req' rather than the notification io_kiocb, sr->notif. For non-vectored imports, sr->notif is correctly used. This is important as the lifetime of the two may be different. Use the correct io_kiocb for the vectored buffer import.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 23371eac7d9a9bca5360cfb3eb3aa08648ee7246 , < 14459281e027f23b70885c1cc1032a71c0efd8d7 (git)
Affected: 23371eac7d9a9bca5360cfb3eb3aa08648ee7246 , < f6041803a831266a2a5a5b5af66f7de0845bcbf3 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 6.15
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.15 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.17.11 , ≤ 6.17.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "io_uring/net.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "14459281e027f23b70885c1cc1032a71c0efd8d7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "23371eac7d9a9bca5360cfb3eb3aa08648ee7246",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f6041803a831266a2a5a5b5af66f7de0845bcbf3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "23371eac7d9a9bca5360cfb3eb3aa08648ee7246",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "io_uring/net.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.17.11",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.17.11",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: ensure vectored buffer node import is tied to notification\n\nWhen support for vectored registered buffers was added, the import\nitself is using \u0027req\u0027 rather than the notification io_kiocb, sr-\u003enotif.\nFor non-vectored imports, sr-\u003enotif is correctly used. This is important\nas the lifetime of the two may be different. Use the correct io_kiocb\nfor the vectored buffer import."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - Exploitation requires a local process to submit an IORING_OP_SENDMSG_ZC operation through io_uring; incoming network traffic alone cannot reach the vulnerable import path.\nAC:L - The attacker controls buffer registration, the vectored send, notification lifetime, and buffer unregistration or replacement. A corked, congested, or deliberately stalled socket can reliably keep the notification outstanding after the main request completes.\nPR:L - An ordinary unprivileged user can create an io_uring instance, register their own memory, and use TCP or UDP sockets without capabilities when io_uring is enabled under its default policy.\nUI:N - No action by another user is required after the attacker submits the operations and manipulates the registered-buffer lifetime.\nS:U - Any resulting kernel compromise is a conventional local privilege escalation within the host kernel\u0027s security authority, not a mandatory cross-scope escape.\nC:H - The premature unpin permits network transmission to continue reading pages after they have been freed or recycled, potentially disclosing arbitrary kernel or other-process memory to an attacker-controlled peer.\nI:H - The stale managed fragments can cause page-reference and allocator corruption when subsequently referenced or downgraded, providing a use-after-free-class primitive that can plausibly be developed into arbitrary memory modification or kernel code execution.\nA:H - Accessing or changing references on prematurely released pages can trigger kernel faults, allocator corruption, oopses, or a system panic."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:10:41.250Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14459281e027f23b70885c1cc1032a71c0efd8d7"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6041803a831266a2a5a5b5af66f7de0845bcbf3"
        }
      ],
      "title": "io_uring/net: ensure vectored buffer node import is tied to notification",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-68294",
    "datePublished": "2025-12-16T15:06:14.177Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-12-16T14:48:05.293Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:10:41.250Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-68294",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00155",
      "percentile": "0.04677"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-07T04:41:31+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-68294",
      "id": "CVE-2025-68294",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-12-16T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "1",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "199",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: Linux kernel: Denial of Service in io_uring/net due to incorrect buffer handling",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-68294.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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