CVE-2025-38434 (GCVE-0-2025-38434)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-07-25 14:32 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:01
VLAI
Title
Revert "riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()"
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Revert "riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()" This reverts commit ad5643cf2f69 ("riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()"). This commit changes TASK_SIZE_MAX to be LONG_MAX to optimize access_ok(), because the previous TASK_SIZE_MAX (default to TASK_SIZE) requires some computation. The reasoning was that all user addresses are less than LONG_MAX, and all kernel addresses are greater than LONG_MAX. Therefore access_ok() can filter kernel addresses. Addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX are not valid user addresses, but access_ok() let them pass. That was thought to be okay, because they are not valid addresses at hardware level. Unfortunately, one case is missed: get_user_pages_fast() happily accepts addresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX. futex(), for instance, uses get_user_pages_fast(). This causes the problem reported by Robert [1]. Therefore, revert this commit. TASK_SIZE_MAX is changed to the default: TASK_SIZE. This unfortunately reduces performance, because TASK_SIZE is more expensive to compute compared to LONG_MAX. But correctness first, we can think about optimization later, if required.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: ad5643cf2f699989daa85d909403febd6712fccb , < fe30c30bf3bb68d4a4d8c7c814769857b5c973e6 (git)
Affected: ad5643cf2f699989daa85d909403febd6712fccb , < f8b1898748dfeb4f9b67b6a6d661f354b9de3523 (git)
Affected: ad5643cf2f699989daa85d909403febd6712fccb , < 890ba5be6335dbbbc99af14ea007befb5f83f174 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 6.10
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.10 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.36 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.15.5 , ≤ 6.15.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.16 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ad5643cf2f699989daa85d909403febd6712fccb",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f8b1898748dfeb4f9b67b6a6d661f354b9de3523",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ad5643cf2f699989daa85d909403febd6712fccb",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "890ba5be6335dbbbc99af14ea007befb5f83f174",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ad5643cf2f699989daa85d909403febd6712fccb",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
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          "programFiles": [
            "arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.10"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.10",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.36",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.15.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.36",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.10",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.15.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.10",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.16",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.10",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRevert \"riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()\"\n\nThis reverts commit ad5643cf2f69 (\"riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for\n__access_ok()\").\n\nThis commit changes TASK_SIZE_MAX to be LONG_MAX to optimize access_ok(),\nbecause the previous TASK_SIZE_MAX (default to TASK_SIZE) requires some\ncomputation.\n\nThe reasoning was that all user addresses are less than LONG_MAX, and all\nkernel addresses are greater than LONG_MAX. Therefore access_ok() can\nfilter kernel addresses.\n\nAddresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX are not valid user addresses, but\naccess_ok() let them pass. That was thought to be okay, because they are\nnot valid addresses at hardware level.\n\nUnfortunately, one case is missed: get_user_pages_fast() happily accepts\naddresses between TASK_SIZE and LONG_MAX. futex(), for instance, uses\nget_user_pages_fast(). This causes the problem reported by Robert [1].\n\nTherefore, revert this commit. TASK_SIZE_MAX is changed to the default:\nTASK_SIZE.\n\nThis unfortunately reduces performance, because TASK_SIZE is more expensive\nto compute compared to LONG_MAX. But correctness first, we can think about\noptimization later, if required."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The bug is reached only through local syscalls (futex(), read()/write() with user iovecs, io_uring fixed-buffer registration) in which the attacker supplies a crafted userspace virtual address; there is no network path to the vulnerable get_user_pages_fast() check.\nAC:L - Exploitation is fully deterministic \u2014 the attacker simply passes an address in [TASK_SIZE, LONG_MAX] to a gup_fast user; there is no race and no attacker-uncontrolled condition on an affected RISC-V 64-bit kernel.\nPR:L - Any unprivileged local user can invoke the affected syscalls (futex, read/write, io_uring); no capabilities or elevated privileges are required.\nUI:N - The attacker triggers the flaw entirely through their own syscalls with no action required from any other user.\nS:U - The vulnerability and its impact are both contained within the OS kernel\u0027s security authority; this is a standard in-kernel memory-safety boundary bug, not a VM/sandbox escape.\nC:H - The flaw lets an unprivileged user pin present kernel PTEs (the generic pte_access_permitted() does not check _PAGE_USER) and read arbitrary kernel memory out via write()-style transfers, a full kernel-memory disclosure primitive.\nI:H - Using FOLL_WRITE paths (e.g. read() into the crafted buffer) the same walk pins writable kernel pages, allowing attacker-controlled data to be written into kernel memory \u2014 an arbitrary kernel write enabling privilege escalation.\nA:H - Walking into the kernel half of the page tables and corrupting or dereferencing kernel structures can trivially oops/panic the kernel."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:01:51.423Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe30c30bf3bb68d4a4d8c7c814769857b5c973e6"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8b1898748dfeb4f9b67b6a6d661f354b9de3523"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/890ba5be6335dbbbc99af14ea007befb5f83f174"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Revert \"riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()\"",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-38434",
    "datePublished": "2025-07-25T14:32:08.089Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:24.015Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:01:51.423Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38434",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00202",
      "percentile": "0.10325"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Low",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-09T18:28:39+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38434",
      "id": "CVE-2025-38434",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-07-25T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "200",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: Revert \"riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()\"",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-38434.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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