CVE-2025-38421 (GCVE-0-2025-38421)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-07-25 14:16 – Updated: 2026-10-21 12:37
VLAI
Title
platform/x86/amd: pmf: Use device managed allocations
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86/amd: pmf: Use device managed allocations If setting up smart PC fails for any reason then this can lead to a double free when unloading amd-pmf. This is because dev->buf was freed but never set to NULL and is again freed in amd_pmf_remove(). To avoid subtle allocation bugs in failures leading to a double free change all allocations into device managed allocations.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: e70b4b8f93d7fcf8ee063a1d1f18782c4da3d335 , < d6a38e1a82d2f9abd0bae84a354654bccb8389f6 (git)
Affected: 5b1122fc4995f308b21d7cfc64ef9880ac834d20 , < 0d10b532f861253c283863522d59d099fcb0796d (git)
Affected: 5b1122fc4995f308b21d7cfc64ef9880ac834d20 , < d9db3a941270d92bbd1a6a6b54a10324484f2f2d (git)
Affected: 3ed60e51ffdbfef14169bd967e21a6ba5e5ff42b (git)
Affected: 6.12.23 , < 6.12.114 (semver)
Affected: 6.13.11 , < 6.14 (semver)
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Linux Linux Affected: 6.14
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.14 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.114 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.15.4 , ≤ 6.15.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.16 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/core.c",
            "drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/tee-if.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "d6a38e1a82d2f9abd0bae84a354654bccb8389f6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e70b4b8f93d7fcf8ee063a1d1f18782c4da3d335",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0d10b532f861253c283863522d59d099fcb0796d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5b1122fc4995f308b21d7cfc64ef9880ac834d20",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d9db3a941270d92bbd1a6a6b54a10324484f2f2d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5b1122fc4995f308b21d7cfc64ef9880ac834d20",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3ed60e51ffdbfef14169bd967e21a6ba5e5ff42b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.12.114",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.12.23",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.14",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.13.11",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/core.c",
            "drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/tee-if.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.114",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.15.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.114",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.12.23",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.15.4",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.16",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.13.11",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86/amd: pmf: Use device managed allocations\n\nIf setting up smart PC fails for any reason then this can lead to\na double free when unloading amd-pmf.  This is because dev-\u003ebuf was\nfreed but never set to NULL and is again freed in amd_pmf_remove().\n\nTo avoid subtle allocation bugs in failures leading to a double free\nchange all allocations into device managed allocations."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The amd-pmf platform driver is reachable only from the local machine \u2014 via driver unbind/module unload, the suspend/resume PM path, or the debugfs `update_policy` handler. There is no network or adjacent-network exposure.\nAC:L - On an affected system (AMD laptop whose BIOS advertises Smart PC while the PMF TA/policy is unavailable) `amd_pmf_init_smart_pc()` fails deterministically at every boot, leaving `dev-\u003ebuf`, `dev-\u003epolicy_buf` and `dev-\u003eprev_data` dangling, so the attacker simply triggers unbind or a suspend/resume cycle to hit the double free/UAF with 100% reliability.\nPR:L - The dangling `pdev-\u003ebuf` is dereferenced from `amd_pmf_resume_handler()`/`amd_pmf_restore_handler()` and from the re-armed `pb_work` handler, and an unprivileged local user in an active session can initiate suspend/resume through logind; heap grooming to control the reused slab object also needs only unprivileged allocations.\nUI:N - The attacker performs the triggering action themselves (driver unbind/module unload or a suspend/resume cycle); no separate victim needs to be induced into any action.\nS:U - The corrupted memory and the resulting privilege escalation are entirely within the kernel\u0027s own security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - The stale `dev-\u003ebuf`/`dev-\u003eprev_data` pointers are read after free (`memcpy(\u0026dev-\u003em_table, dev-\u003ebuf, dev-\u003emtable_size)` in `amd_pmf_get_smu_info()`), leaking reallocated kernel slab contents, and the double free gives the attacker a slab object shared with another subsystem, which is a general kernel-memory read primitive.\nI:H - The double free of `dev-\u003ebuf` (and of `policy_buf`/`prev_data`) lets the same slab object be handed to two owners, and the UAF write paths (`memset(dev-\u003ebuf, 0, dev-\u003emtable_size)`, `dev-\u003eprev_data-\u003espl = val`, plus SMU DMA into the freed page programmed by `amd_pmf_set_dram_addr()`) provide a controlled write into live kernel objects, which is exploitable for control-flow hijack.\nA:H - A double free triggers immediate slab freelist corruption \u2014 a BUG/panic under freelist hardening or CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG, and unbounded heap corruption leading to a crash otherwise; the UAF accesses from the PM resume path can be repeated to reliably crash the system."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-21T12:37:04.677Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6a38e1a82d2f9abd0bae84a354654bccb8389f6"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d10b532f861253c283863522d59d099fcb0796d"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9db3a941270d92bbd1a6a6b54a10324484f2f2d"
        }
      ],
      "title": "platform/x86/amd: pmf: Use device managed allocations",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-38421",
    "datePublished": "2025-07-25T14:16:42.409Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:24.014Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-21T12:37:04.677Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38421",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00235",
      "percentile": "0.1464"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Low",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-09T18:28:34+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38421",
      "id": "CVE-2025-38421",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-07-25T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "200",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: platform/x86/amd: pmf: Use device managed allocations",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-38421.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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