CVE-2025-38287 (GCVE-0-2025-38287)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-07-10 07:42 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:00
VLAI
Title
IB/cm: Drop lockdep assert and WARN when freeing old msg
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/cm: Drop lockdep assert and WARN when freeing old msg The send completion handler can run after cm_id has advanced to another message. The cm_id lock is not needed in this case, but a recent change re-used cm_free_priv_msg(), which asserts that the lock is held and WARNs if the cm_id's currently outstanding msg is different than the one being freed.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 1e5159219076ddb2e44338c667c83fd1bd43dfef , < fc096a0cd2017cb0aa1e7fb83131410af9283910 (git)
Affected: 1e5159219076ddb2e44338c667c83fd1bd43dfef , < 7590649ee7af381a9d1153143026dec124c5798e (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 6.13
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.13 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.15.3 , ≤ 6.15.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.16 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "fc096a0cd2017cb0aa1e7fb83131410af9283910",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1e5159219076ddb2e44338c667c83fd1bd43dfef",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7590649ee7af381a9d1153143026dec124c5798e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1e5159219076ddb2e44338c667c83fd1bd43dfef",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.13"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.13",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.15.3",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.15.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.16",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nIB/cm: Drop lockdep assert and WARN when freeing old msg\n\nThe send completion handler can run after cm_id has advanced to another\nmessage.  The cm_id lock is not needed in this case, but a recent change\nre-used cm_free_priv_msg(), which asserts that the lock is held and\nWARNs if the cm_id\u0027s currently outstanding msg is different than the one\nbeing freed."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:N - The vulnerable path is entered from `cm_send_handler()`, driven by CM MADs received from a remote RDMA peer (RTU/REP/REJ/DREQ/DREP cancel the outstanding private MAD), against in-kernel RDMA listeners such as nvmet-rdma, nfsd/RDMA or SMB Direct. Under RoCEv2 these CM MADs are carried in IP-routable UDP/4791 traffic, so the attacker need not share an L2 segment.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both halves of the race \u2014 the `ib_cancel_mad()` that defers the flush completion (by sending RTU/DREP/REJ) and the subsequent private-MAD allocation (by forcing a disconnect/DREQ) \u2014 and can open many parallel connections to saturate the MAD workqueue and retry indefinitely until the ordering inverts.\nPR:N - IB CM connection establishment (REQ/REP/RTU/DREQ) completes entirely before any ULP-level authentication such as NVMe-oF or SMB, so an unauthenticated peer on the fabric can drive the victim cm_id through the required state transitions.\nUI:N - The state transitions are performed by the kernel CM state machine in response to attacker-supplied MADs and workqueue-deferred send completions; no action by any local user is required.\nS:U - The WARN and lockdep assert fire inside the kernel\u0027s own IB CM code and affect only the kernel\u0027s security authority; no VM, IOMMU or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:N - The buggy path frees the message identically to the fixed path \u2014 no out-of-bounds read, no use-after-free, no uninitialized data exposure. The WARN backtrace goes only to dmesg with hashed pointers, which the triggering remote attacker cannot observe.\nI:N - The `WARN_ON()` guard suppresses the erroneous `cm_id_priv-\u003emsg = NULL` store, and the AH destroy, cm_id deref and MAD free are all correct, so no kernel state or memory is corrupted.\nA:H - Each occurrence emits a `WARN_ON()` splat (plus a lockdep splat on PROVE_LOCKING kernels) that taints the kernel and is a full panic on the many hardened deployments running `panic_on_warn=1`; the attacker can trigger it repeatedly at will."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:00:59.136Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc096a0cd2017cb0aa1e7fb83131410af9283910"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7590649ee7af381a9d1153143026dec124c5798e"
        }
      ],
      "title": "IB/cm: Drop lockdep assert and WARN when freeing old msg",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-38287",
    "datePublished": "2025-07-10T07:42:04.056Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:24.000Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:00:59.136Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38287",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00343",
      "percentile": "0.28393"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-05T14:56:25+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38287",
      "id": "CVE-2025-38287",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-07-10T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "124",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "76",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: Kernel: Denial of Service in IB/cm component due to improper message handling",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-38287.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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