CVE-2025-30193 (GCVE-0-2025-30193)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-05-20 11:17 – Updated: 2025-05-20 13:16
VLAI
Title
Denial of service via crafted TCP exchange
Summary
In some circumstances, when DNSdist is configured to allow an unlimited number of queries on a single, incoming TCP connection from a client, an attacker can cause a denial of service by crafting a TCP exchange that triggers an exhaustion of the stack and a crash of DNSdist, causing a denial of service. The remedy is: upgrade to the patched 1.9.10 version. A workaround is to restrict the maximum number of queries on incoming TCP connections to a safe value, like 50, via the setMaxTCPQueriesPerConnection setting. We would like to thank Renaud Allard for bringing this issue to our attention.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-05-20 13:16 UTC
CWE
Assigner
OX CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
PowerDNS DNSdist Unaffected: 1.9.10 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2025-05-20 11:00
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2025-30193",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2025-05-20T13:16:06.361581Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2025-05-20T13:16:34.707Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.powerdns.com/",
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "modules": [
            "DNS over TCP"
          ],
          "packageName": "dnsdist",
          "product": "DNSdist",
          "programFiles": [
            "dnsdist-tcp.cc"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns",
          "vendor": "PowerDNS",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "1.9.10",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Renaud Allard"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2025-05-20T11:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "In some circumstances, when DNSdist is configured to allow an unlimited number of queries on a single, incoming TCP connection from a client, an attacker can cause a denial of service by crafting a TCP exchange that triggers an exhaustion of the stack and a crash of DNSdist, causing a denial of service.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe remedy is: upgrade to the patched 1.9.10 version.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eA workaround is to restrict the maximum number of queries on incoming TCP connections to a safe value, like 50, via the setMaxTCPQueriesPerConnection setting.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWe would like to thank Renaud Allard for bringing this issue to our attention.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "In some circumstances, when DNSdist is configured to allow an unlimited number of queries on a single, incoming TCP connection from a client, an attacker can cause a denial of service by crafting a TCP exchange that triggers an exhaustion of the stack and a crash of DNSdist, causing a denial of service.\n\nThe remedy is: upgrade to the patched 1.9.10 version.\n\nA workaround is to restrict the maximum number of queries on incoming TCP connections to a safe value, like 50, via the setMaxTCPQueriesPerConnection setting.\n\nWe would like to thank Renaud Allard for bringing this issue to our attention."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-674",
              "description": "CWE-674 Uncontrolled Recursion",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2025-05-20T11:17:17.378Z",
        "orgId": "8ce71d90-2354-404b-a86e-bec2cc4e6981",
        "shortName": "OX"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://dnsdist.org/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-for-dnsdist-2025-03.html"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "PowerDNS Security Advisory 2025-03",
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Denial of service via crafted TCP exchange",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "8ce71d90-2354-404b-a86e-bec2cc4e6981",
    "assignerShortName": "OX",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-30193",
    "datePublished": "2025-05-20T11:17:17.378Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-03-18T08:39:46.884Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2025-05-20T13:16:34.707Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-30193",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00618",
      "percentile": "0.50409"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "current_release_date": "2026-06-28T11:21:36+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-30193",
      "id": "CVE-2025-30193",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-05-20T11:17:17.378000+00:00",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "1",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "dnsdist: Denial of service via crafted TCP exchange",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-30193.json",
      "version": "3"
    },
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": {
        "adp": [
          {
            "metrics": [
              {
                "other": {
                  "content": {
                    "id": "CVE-2025-30193",
                    "options": [
                      {
                        "Exploitation": "none"
                      },
                      {
                        "Automatable": "yes"
                      },
                      {
                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                      }
                    ],
                    "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                    "timestamp": "2025-05-20T13:16:06.361581Z",
                    "version": "2.0.3"
                  },
                  "type": "ssvc"
                }
              }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
              "dateUpdated": "2025-05-20T13:16:25.553Z",
              "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
            },
            "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
          }
        ],
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "collectionURL": "https://repo.powerdns.com/",
              "defaultStatus": "affected",
              "modules": [
                "DNS over TCP"
              ],
              "packageName": "dnsdist",
              "product": "DNSdist",
              "programFiles": [
                "dnsdist-tcp.cc"
              ],
              "repo": "https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns",
              "vendor": "PowerDNS",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "status": "unaffected",
                  "version": "1.9.10",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "Renaud Allard"
            }
          ],
          "datePublic": "2025-05-20T11:00:00.000Z",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "In some circumstances, when DNSdist is configured to allow an unlimited number of queries on a single, incoming TCP connection from a client, an attacker can cause a denial of service by crafting a TCP exchange that triggers an exhaustion of the stack and a crash of DNSdist, causing a denial of service.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe remedy is: upgrade to the patched 1.9.10 version.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eA workaround is to restrict the maximum number of queries on incoming TCP connections to a safe value, like 50, via the setMaxTCPQueriesPerConnection setting.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWe would like to thank Renaud Allard for bringing this issue to our attention.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "In some circumstances, when DNSdist is configured to allow an unlimited number of queries on a single, incoming TCP connection from a client, an attacker can cause a denial of service by crafting a TCP exchange that triggers an exhaustion of the stack and a crash of DNSdist, causing a denial of service.\n\nThe remedy is: upgrade to the patched 1.9.10 version.\n\nA workaround is to restrict the maximum number of queries on incoming TCP connections to a safe value, like 50, via the setMaxTCPQueriesPerConnection setting.\n\nWe would like to thank Renaud Allard for bringing this issue to our attention."
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV3_1": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                "baseScore": 7.5,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "integrityImpact": "NONE",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
                "version": "3.1"
              },
              "format": "CVSS",
              "scenarios": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "GENERAL"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-674",
                  "description": "CWE-674 Uncontrolled Recursion",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2025-05-20T11:17:17.378Z",
            "orgId": "8ce71d90-2354-404b-a86e-bec2cc4e6981",
            "shortName": "OX"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "url": "https://dnsdist.org/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-for-dnsdist-2025-03.html"
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "advisory": "PowerDNS Security Advisory 2025-03",
            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "Denial of service via crafted TCP exchange",
          "x_generator": {
            "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
          }
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "8ce71d90-2354-404b-a86e-bec2cc4e6981",
        "assignerShortName": "OX",
        "cveId": "CVE-2025-30193",
        "datePublished": "2025-05-20T11:17:17.378Z",
        "dateReserved": "2025-03-18T08:39:46.884Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2025-05-20T13:16:34.707Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.1"
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.