CVE-2025-21825 (GCVE-0-2025-21825)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-03-06 16:04 – Updated: 2026-10-21 12:36| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 , < 50e44aa5f9905d237c245b8012937ef4dd971dcb
(git)
Affected: b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 , < 33e47d9573075342a41783a55c8c67bc71246fc1 (git) Affected: b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 , < fbeda3d939ca10063aafa7a77cc0f409d82cda88 (git) Affected: b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 , < 58f038e6d209d2dd862fcf5de55407855856794d (git) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
5.15
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.15 (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.160 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.13 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.13.2 , ≤ 6.13.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.14 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Cancel the running bpf_timer through kworker for PREEMPT_RT\n\nDuring the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated\nhtab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The\nreason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has\nalready been stashed in htab-\u003eextra_elems after alloc_htab_elem()\nreturns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked,\nthe stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the\nfreeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the\nold_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may\nacquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller\nhas already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning\nwill be reported when such race happens:\n\n BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003\n 3 locks held by test_progs/676:\n #0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830\n #1: ffff88810e961188 (\u0026htab-\u003elockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500\n #2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (\u0026base-\u003esoftirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0\n Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)\n Preemption disabled at:\n [\u003cffffffff817837a3\u003e] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ #11\n Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)...\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70\n dump_stack+0x10/0x20\n __schedule_bug+0x120/0x170\n __schedule+0x300c/0x4800\n schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60\n rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0\n rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230\n hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0\n hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30\n bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40\n bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80\n bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0\n check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280\n htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500\n bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43\n bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e\n bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830\n __sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0\n __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0\n x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10\n do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n ...\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nIt seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems\ninto two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket\nlock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after\nthe bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent\noverwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when\nthe map is full.\n\nTherefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling\nof bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT:\n1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value\n2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to\n cancel it again\nConsidering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try\nto acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is\nrunning, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has\ndownside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is\ndelayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable\n(e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in\nlocked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if\nnecessary.\n\nIt is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the\nproblem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the\nsoftirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced\nin v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra\ndepends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT.\n\nDepends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled"
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"value": "AV:L - The vulnerable path is entered through the bpf() syscall (BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM / BPF_MAP_DELETE_ELEM on a preallocated hash map, or a BPF program performing the update), which requires local access to the system. There is no remote or adjacent-network trigger.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race: it arms the bpf_timer, authors the callback (which can be made to run for milliseconds via bpf_loop, keeping softirq_expiry_lock held and hrtimer_try_to_cancel() returning -1 the whole time), and hammers map_update_elem from another CPU, making the hit near-deterministic \u2014 as the upstream selftest demonstrates.\nPR:L - The bpf_timer helpers and map creation are gated on bpf_token_capable(CAP_BPF), which resolves to bpf_ns_capable() and is therefore delegable into an unprivileged user namespace via a BPF token, and the overwrite itself only needs write access to the map fd (e.g. a bpffs-pinned map). This is consistent with the CNA\u0027s PR:L treatment of other BPF-subsystem CVEs.\nUI:N - The attacker performs every step itself \u2014 creating the map, arming the timer, and issuing the overwriting update. No action by any other user or administrator is needed.\nS:U - The corruption and the lockup are confined to kernel memory and the kernel\u0027s own scheduling state, within the same security authority. No VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Sleeping mid-bpf_obj_free_fields() breaks the non-preemptible window that protects htab-\u003eextra_elems, letting another task on the same CPU re-install the element while its special fields are still being torn down \u2014 yielding a use-after-free on kptr-referenced kernel objects that can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - The same reuse window causes bpf_obj_free_fields() to xchg-and-drop kptrs and cancel timers belonging to a live map element, producing refcount underflow and double-free of refcounted kernel objects \u2014 a classic heap-corruption write primitive usable for control-flow hijack.\nA:H - The immediate symptom is a \"BUG: scheduling while atomic\" splat (a panic under panic_on_warn), and the task deschedules while holding the bucket raw spinlock with hardirqs disabled, so other CPUs spin on it indefinitely \u2014 leading to hard lockup, deadlock against the timer softirq thread, or panic from the resulting UAF."
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Cancel the running bpf_timer through kworker for PREEMPT_RT\n\nDuring the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated\nhtab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The\nreason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has\nalready been stashed in htab-\u003eextra_elems after alloc_htab_elem()\nreturns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked,\nthe stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the\nfreeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the\nold_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may\nacquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller\nhas already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning\nwill be reported when such race happens:\n\n BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003\n 3 locks held by test_progs/676:\n #0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830\n #1: ffff88810e961188 (\u0026htab-\u003elockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500\n #2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (\u0026base-\u003esoftirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0\n Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)\n Preemption disabled at:\n [\u003cffffffff817837a3\u003e] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ #11\n Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)...\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70\n dump_stack+0x10/0x20\n __schedule_bug+0x120/0x170\n __schedule+0x300c/0x4800\n schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60\n rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0\n rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230\n hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0\n hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30\n bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40\n bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80\n bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0\n check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280\n htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500\n bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43\n bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e\n bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830\n __sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0\n __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0\n x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10\n do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n ...\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nIt seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems\ninto two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket\nlock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after\nthe bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent\noverwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when\nthe map is full.\n\nTherefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling\nof bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT:\n1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value\n2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to\n cancel it again\nConsidering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try\nto acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is\nrunning, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has\ndownside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is\ndelayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable\n(e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in\nlocked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if\nnecessary.\n\nIt is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the\nproblem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the\nsoftirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced\nin v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra\ndepends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT.\n\nDepends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled"
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"value": "AV:L - The vulnerable path is entered through the bpf() syscall (BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM / BPF_MAP_DELETE_ELEM on a preallocated hash map, or a BPF program performing the update), which requires local access to the system. There is no remote or adjacent-network trigger.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race: it arms the bpf_timer, authors the callback (which can be made to run for milliseconds via bpf_loop, keeping softirq_expiry_lock held and hrtimer_try_to_cancel() returning -1 the whole time), and hammers map_update_elem from another CPU, making the hit near-deterministic \u2014 as the upstream selftest demonstrates.\nPR:L - The bpf_timer helpers and map creation are gated on bpf_token_capable(CAP_BPF), which resolves to bpf_ns_capable() and is therefore delegable into an unprivileged user namespace via a BPF token, and the overwrite itself only needs write access to the map fd (e.g. a bpffs-pinned map). This is consistent with the CNA\u0027s PR:L treatment of other BPF-subsystem CVEs.\nUI:N - The attacker performs every step itself \u2014 creating the map, arming the timer, and issuing the overwriting update. No action by any other user or administrator is needed.\nS:U - The corruption and the lockup are confined to kernel memory and the kernel\u0027s own scheduling state, within the same security authority. No VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Sleeping mid-bpf_obj_free_fields() breaks the non-preemptible window that protects htab-\u003eextra_elems, letting another task on the same CPU re-install the element while its special fields are still being torn down \u2014 yielding a use-after-free on kptr-referenced kernel objects that can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - The same reuse window causes bpf_obj_free_fields() to xchg-and-drop kptrs and cancel timers belonging to a live map element, producing refcount underflow and double-free of refcounted kernel objects \u2014 a classic heap-corruption write primitive usable for control-flow hijack.\nA:H - The immediate symptom is a \"BUG: scheduling while atomic\" splat (a panic under panic_on_warn), and the task deschedules while holding the bucket raw spinlock with hardirqs disabled, so other CPUs spin on it indefinitely \u2014 leading to hard lockup, deadlock against the timer softirq thread, or panic from the resulting UAF."
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-21T12:36:01.343Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50e44aa5f9905d237c245b8012937ef4dd971dcb"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33e47d9573075342a41783a55c8c67bc71246fc1"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbeda3d939ca10063aafa7a77cc0f409d82cda88"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58f038e6d209d2dd862fcf5de55407855856794d"
}
],
"title": "bpf: Cancel the running bpf_timer through kworker for PREEMPT_RT",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2025-21825",
"datePublished": "2025-03-06T16:04:31.576Z",
"dateReserved": "2024-12-29T08:45:45.775Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-21T12:36:01.343Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
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}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.