CVE-2024-58098 (GCVE-0-2024-58098)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-05-05 14:53 – Updated: 2026-10-15 21:51
VLAI
Title
bpf: track changes_pkt_data property for global functions
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: track changes_pkt_data property for global functions When processing calls to certain helpers, verifier invalidates all packet pointers in a current state. For example, consider the following program: __attribute__((__noinline__)) long skb_pull_data(struct __sk_buff *sk, __u32 len) { return bpf_skb_pull_data(sk, len); } SEC("tc") int test_invalidate_checks(struct __sk_buff *sk) { int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data; if ((void *)(p + 1) > (void *)(long)sk->data_end) return TCX_DROP; skb_pull_data(sk, 0); *p = 42; return TCX_PASS; } After a call to bpf_skb_pull_data() the pointer 'p' can't be used safely. See function filter.c:bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() for a list of such helpers. At the moment verifier invalidates packet pointers when processing helper function calls, and does not traverse global sub-programs when processing calls to global sub-programs. This means that calls to helpers done from global sub-programs do not invalidate pointers in the caller state. E.g. the program above is unsafe, but is not rejected by verifier. This commit fixes the omission by computing field bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data for each sub-program before main verification pass. changes_pkt_data should be set if: - subprogram calls helper for which bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data returns true; - subprogram calls a global function, for which bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data should be set. The verifier.c:check_cfg() pass is modified to compute this information. The commit relies on depth first instruction traversal done by check_cfg() and absence of recursive function calls: - check_cfg() would eventually visit every call to subprogram S in a state when S is fully explored; - when S is fully explored: - every direct helper call within S is explored (and thus changes_pkt_data is set if needed); - every call to subprogram S1 called by S was visited with S1 fully explored (and thus S inherits changes_pkt_data from S1). The downside of such approach is that dead code elimination is not taken into account: if a helper call inside global function is dead because of current configuration, verifier would conservatively assume that the call occurs for the purpose of the changes_pkt_data computation.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-15 21:42 UTC
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 51c39bb1d5d105a02e29aa7960f0a395086e6342 , < 79751e9227a5910c0e5a2c7186877d91821d957d (git)
Affected: 51c39bb1d5d105a02e29aa7960f0a395086e6342 , < 1d572c60488b52882b719ed273767ee3b280413d (git)
Affected: 51c39bb1d5d105a02e29aa7960f0a395086e6342 , < 51081a3f25c742da5a659d7fc6fd77ebfdd555be (git)
Create a notification for this product.
Linux Linux Affected: 5.6
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.6 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.6.90 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.25 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.13 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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  }
}



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Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.