CVE-2024-57899 (GCVE-0-2024-57899)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-01-15 13:05 – Updated: 2026-08-05 11:46
VLAI
Title
wifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems On 32-bit systems, the size of an unsigned long is 4 bytes, while a u64 is 8 bytes. Therefore, when using or_each_set_bit(bit, &bits, sizeof(changed) * BITS_PER_BYTE), the code is incorrectly searching for a bit in a 32-bit variable that is expected to be 64 bits in size, leading to incorrect bit finding. Solution: Ensure that the size of the bits variable is correctly adjusted for each architecture. Call Trace: ? show_regs+0x54/0x58 ? __warn+0x6b/0xd4 ? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211] ? report_bug+0x113/0x150 ? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30 ? handle_bug+0x27/0x44 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50 ? handle_exception+0xf6/0xf6 ? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30 ? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211] ? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30 ? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211] ? ieee80211_mesh_work+0xff/0x260 [mac80211] ? cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x72/0x98 [cfg80211] ? process_one_work+0xf1/0x1fc ? worker_thread+0x2c0/0x3b4 ? kthread+0xc7/0xf0 ? mod_delayed_work_on+0x4c/0x4c ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14 ? ret_from_fork+0x24/0x38 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14 ? ret_from_fork_asm+0xf/0x14 ? entry_INT80_32+0xf0/0xf0 [restore no-op path for no changes]
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 15ddba5f43114c1fd9cd83676e04a9e1acf8e37f , < 86772872f9f5097cd03d0e1c6813238bd38c250b (git)
Affected: 15ddba5f43114c1fd9cd83676e04a9e1acf8e37f , < 36b739637d7042843f9df57212ecee6ed6e0d4b2 (git)
Affected: 15ddba5f43114c1fd9cd83676e04a9e1acf8e37f , < 49dba1ded8dd5a6a12748631403240b2ab245c34 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 6.5
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.5 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.6.70 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.9 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.13 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/mac80211/mesh.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "86772872f9f5097cd03d0e1c6813238bd38c250b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "15ddba5f43114c1fd9cd83676e04a9e1acf8e37f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "36b739637d7042843f9df57212ecee6ed6e0d4b2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "15ddba5f43114c1fd9cd83676e04a9e1acf8e37f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "49dba1ded8dd5a6a12748631403240b2ab245c34",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "15ddba5f43114c1fd9cd83676e04a9e1acf8e37f",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/mac80211/mesh.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.5"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.5",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.70",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.9",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.13",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.6.70",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.5",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.9",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.5",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.13",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.5",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems\n\nOn 32-bit systems, the size of an unsigned long is 4 bytes,\nwhile a u64 is 8 bytes. Therefore, when using\nor_each_set_bit(bit, \u0026bits, sizeof(changed) * BITS_PER_BYTE),\nthe code is incorrectly searching for a bit in a 32-bit\nvariable that is expected to be 64 bits in size,\nleading to incorrect bit finding.\n\nSolution: Ensure that the size of the bits variable is correctly\nadjusted for each architecture.\n\n Call Trace:\n  ? show_regs+0x54/0x58\n  ? __warn+0x6b/0xd4\n  ? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]\n  ? report_bug+0x113/0x150\n  ? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30\n  ? handle_bug+0x27/0x44\n  ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50\n  ? handle_exception+0xf6/0xf6\n  ? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30\n  ? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]\n  ? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30\n  ? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]\n  ? ieee80211_mesh_work+0xff/0x260 [mac80211]\n  ? cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x72/0x98 [cfg80211]\n  ? process_one_work+0xf1/0x1fc\n  ? worker_thread+0x2c0/0x3b4\n  ? kthread+0xc7/0xf0\n  ? mod_delayed_work_on+0x4c/0x4c\n  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14\n  ? ret_from_fork+0x24/0x38\n  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14\n  ? ret_from_fork_asm+0xf/0x14\n  ? entry_INT80_32+0xf0/0xf0\n\n[restore no-op path for no changes]"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.6,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:A - The vulnerable function is reached from mac80211\u0027s 802.11s mesh receive paths \u2014 `ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp()` \u2192 `mesh_neighbour_update()` and `mesh_rx_plink_frame()` \u2192 `mesh_process_plink_frame()` \u2014 both driven purely by 802.11 frames transmitted by a node in radio range. WiFi frame injection is Adjacent, not Network.\nAC:L - The attacker reliably and repeatedly triggers the path by transmitting mesh beacons/probe responses or peering frames with a matching mesh ID, and the frame-parsing code (`ieee802_11_parse_elems`, `mesh_plink_fsm`) runs on the same stack region immediately beforehand, so the adjacent stack word read out-of-bounds is substantially attacker-influenced rather than beyond their control.\nPR:N - No authentication or association is required \u2014 on an open mesh (`IEEE80211_MESH_SEC_NONE`) an unauthenticated neighbour\u0027s beacon alone drives `mesh_neighbour_update()` and auto peer-link open, and mesh peering action frames are likewise processed before any credentials are verified.\nUI:N - A mesh node processes received beacons, probe responses and peering frames automatically as part of normal operation; no action by any local user or administrator is needed.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds stack read, the corrupted `mbss_changed` bitmap and the resulting bogus driver reconfiguration all occur within the kernel\u0027s own security authority, with no crossing into another security scope.\nC:L - `_find_next_bit()` reads 4 bytes of adjacent kernel stack past the 4-byte `bits` variable, disclosing leftover stack contents into the change bitmap; the read is strictly bounded to one machine word and is never copied to the attacker directly, though the leaked bits can influence externally observable driver/radio state (e.g. `BSS_CHANGED_TPE`).\nI:L - Garbage bits 32\u201363 are propagated into a u64 change mask and handed to the driver\u0027s `link_info_changed` callback, causing unintended link and hardware reconfiguration with flags that are invalid for a mesh vif; the `set_bit()` writes themselves stay within the 64-bit `mbss_changed` bitmap, so there is no arbitrary-write primitive.\nA:H - The corrupted flags reach `WARN_ON_ONCE(changed \u0026 BSS_CHANGED_VIF_CFG_FLAGS)` in `ieee80211_link_info_change_notify()` \u2014 a kernel splat that panics outright on the `panic_on_warn` configurations common in embedded/router deployments \u2014 and the same bogus flags drive drivers into unexpected reconfiguration paths, remotely and repeatedly triggerable without authentication."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:46:51.150Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86772872f9f5097cd03d0e1c6813238bd38c250b"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36b739637d7042843f9df57212ecee6ed6e0d4b2"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49dba1ded8dd5a6a12748631403240b2ab245c34"
        }
      ],
      "title": "wifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2024-57899",
    "datePublished": "2025-01-15T13:05:50.701Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-01-11T14:45:42.030Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:46:51.150Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2024-57899",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00319",
      "percentile": "0.25349"
    },
    "microsoft_vex": {
      "current_release_date": "2026-10-06T01:54:50.000Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2024-57899",
      "id": "msrc_CVE-2024-57899",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-10-19T01:01:38.000Z",
      "product_status:known_affected": "5",
      "source": "Microsoft CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "wifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2025/msrc_cve-2024-57899.json",
      "version": "6"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Low",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-09T18:22:07+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2024-57899",
      "id": "CVE-2024-57899",
      "initial_release_date": "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "200",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: wifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2024/cve-2024-57899.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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