CVE-2024-56635 (GCVE-0-2024-56635)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-12-27 15:02 – Updated: 2026-08-05 11:45- CWE-416 - Use After Free
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
8c55facecd7ade835287298ce325f930d888d8ec , < 3265aab0736f78bb218200b06b1abb525c316269
(git)
Affected: 8c55facecd7ade835287298ce325f930d888d8ec , < 316183d58319f191e16503bc2dffa156c4442df2 (git) Affected: 8c55facecd7ade835287298ce325f930d888d8ec , < 750e51603395e755537da08f745864c93e3ce741 (git) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.2
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.2 (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.66 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.5 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.13 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: avoid potential UAF in default_operstate()\n\nsyzbot reported an UAF in default_operstate() [1]\n\nIssue is a race between device and netns dismantles.\n\nAfter calling __rtnl_unlock() from netdev_run_todo(),\nwe can not assume the netns of each device is still alive.\n\nMake sure the device is not in NETREG_UNREGISTERED state,\nand add an ASSERT_RTNL() before the call to\n__dev_get_by_index().\n\nWe might move this ASSERT_RTNL() in __dev_get_by_index()\nin the future.\n\n[1]\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __dev_get_by_index+0x5d/0x110 net/core/dev.c:852\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888043eba1b0 by task syz.0.0/5339\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5339 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-10296-gaaf20f870da0 #0\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]\n print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489\n kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602\n __dev_get_by_index+0x5d/0x110 net/core/dev.c:852\n default_operstate net/core/link_watch.c:51 [inline]\n rfc2863_policy+0x224/0x300 net/core/link_watch.c:67\n linkwatch_do_dev+0x3e/0x170 net/core/link_watch.c:170\n netdev_run_todo+0x461/0x1000 net/core/dev.c:10894\n rtnl_unlock net/core/rtnetlink.c:152 [inline]\n rtnl_net_unlock include/linux/rtnetlink.h:133 [inline]\n rtnl_dellink+0x760/0x8d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3520\n rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x791/0xcf0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2541\n netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]\n netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347\n netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891\n sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]\n __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:726\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2583\n ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2637 [inline]\n __sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2669\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nRIP: 0033:0x7f2a3cb80809\nCode: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f2a3d9cd058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2a3cd45fa0 RCX: 00007f2a3cb80809\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000008\nRBP: 00007f2a3cbf393e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f2a3cd45fa0 R15: 00007ffd03bc65c8\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAllocated by task 5339:\n kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]\n kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68\n poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394\n kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4314\n kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]\n kmalloc_array_noprof include/linux/slab.h:945 [inline]\n netdev_create_hash net/core/dev.c:11870 [inline]\n netdev_init+0x10c/0x250 net/core/dev.c:11890\n ops_init+0x31e/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:138\n setup_net+0x287/0x9e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:362\n copy_net_ns+0x33f/0x570 net/core/net_namespace.c:500\n create_new_namespaces+0x425/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\n unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x124/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:228\n ksys_unshare+0x57d/0xa70 kernel/fork.c:3314\n __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3385 [inline]\n __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3383 [inline]\n __x64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3383\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x8\n---truncated---"
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: avoid potential UAF in default_operstate()\n\nsyzbot reported an UAF in default_operstate() [1]\n\nIssue is a race between device and netns dismantles.\n\nAfter calling __rtnl_unlock() from netdev_run_todo(),\nwe can not assume the netns of each device is still alive.\n\nMake sure the device is not in NETREG_UNREGISTERED state,\nand add an ASSERT_RTNL() before the call to\n__dev_get_by_index().\n\nWe might move this ASSERT_RTNL() in __dev_get_by_index()\nin the future.\n\n[1]\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __dev_get_by_index+0x5d/0x110 net/core/dev.c:852\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888043eba1b0 by task syz.0.0/5339\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5339 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-10296-gaaf20f870da0 #0\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]\n print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489\n kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602\n __dev_get_by_index+0x5d/0x110 net/core/dev.c:852\n default_operstate net/core/link_watch.c:51 [inline]\n rfc2863_policy+0x224/0x300 net/core/link_watch.c:67\n linkwatch_do_dev+0x3e/0x170 net/core/link_watch.c:170\n netdev_run_todo+0x461/0x1000 net/core/dev.c:10894\n rtnl_unlock net/core/rtnetlink.c:152 [inline]\n rtnl_net_unlock include/linux/rtnetlink.h:133 [inline]\n rtnl_dellink+0x760/0x8d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3520\n rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x791/0xcf0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2541\n netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]\n netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347\n netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891\n sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]\n __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:726\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2583\n ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2637 [inline]\n __sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2669\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nRIP: 0033:0x7f2a3cb80809\nCode: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f2a3d9cd058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2a3cd45fa0 RCX: 00007f2a3cb80809\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000008\nRBP: 00007f2a3cbf393e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f2a3cd45fa0 R15: 00007ffd03bc65c8\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAllocated by task 5339:\n kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]\n kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68\n poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394\n kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4314\n kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]\n kmalloc_array_noprof include/linux/slab.h:945 [inline]\n netdev_create_hash net/core/dev.c:11870 [inline]\n netdev_init+0x10c/0x250 net/core/dev.c:11890\n ops_init+0x31e/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:138\n setup_net+0x287/0x9e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:362\n copy_net_ns+0x33f/0x570 net/core/net_namespace.c:500\n create_new_namespaces+0x425/0x7b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\n unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x124/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:228\n ksys_unshare+0x57d/0xa70 kernel/fork.c:3314\n __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3385 [inline]\n __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3383 [inline]\n __x64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3383\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x8\n---truncated---"
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The vulnerability is reached through local syscalls only \u2014 `unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET)` to create the namespace and an `RTM_DELLINK` rtnetlink message via `sendmsg()` on an `AF_NETLINK` socket. No network peer data is involved.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race: they create and populate the netns, choose when to drop its last reference (triggering `cleanup_net`), and choose when to send RTM_DELLINK, and can retry the race in a loop indefinitely at no cost. syzbot reproduced it, and veth/vlan/macvlan satisfy the `iflink != ifindex` precondition in default configurations.\nPR:L - An unprivileged local user gets CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a new network namespace via `unshare -Urn`, which is exactly the path in the syzbot allocation trace (`ksys_unshare` \u2192 `copy_net_ns`), and that is sufficient to create veth devices and issue RTM_DELLINK.\nUI:N - The attacker performs all steps itself \u2014 namespace creation, device creation, link deletion, and namespace teardown \u2014 with no action required from any other user.\nS:U - The use-after-free occurs in kernel memory and its impact stays within the kernel\u0027s own security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or hypervisor boundary is crossed.\nC:H - This is a slab use-after-free read of a freed `kmalloc-2k` hash array whose contents the attacker can control via heap spray, turning the `hlist_for_each_entry()` walk into a controlled-pointer dereference; the resulting carrier bit is reflected into `dev-\u003eoperstate` and read back over netlink, yielding a kernel memory disclosure oracle.\nI:H - A use-after-free on a heavily reused general-purpose slab cache gives the attacker influence over the freed object contents and over which pointer the kernel follows and stores as `peer`, which is the standard basis for escalating to control-flow/state corruption.\nA:H - KASAN confirms a slab-use-after-free read, and walking the stale hash bucket dereferences reused or garbage pointers, causing a kernel oops or panic; the race can be retried repeatedly to force a crash."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:45:36.867Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3265aab0736f78bb218200b06b1abb525c316269"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/316183d58319f191e16503bc2dffa156c4442df2"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/750e51603395e755537da08f745864c93e3ce741"
}
],
"title": "net: avoid potential UAF in default_operstate()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2024-56635",
"datePublished": "2024-12-27T15:02:38.213Z",
"dateReserved": "2024-12-27T15:00:39.838Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:45:36.867Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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