CVE-2024-36961 (GCVE-0-2024-36961)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-06-03 07:49 – Updated: 2026-08-05 11:32
VLAI
Title
thermal/debugfs: Fix two locking issues with thermal zone debug
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thermal/debugfs: Fix two locking issues with thermal zone debug With the current thermal zone locking arrangement in the debugfs code, user space can open the "mitigations" file for a thermal zone before the zone's debugfs pointer is set which will result in a NULL pointer dereference in tze_seq_start(). Moreover, thermal_debug_tz_remove() is not called under the thermal zone lock, so it can run in parallel with the other functions accessing the thermal zone's struct thermal_debugfs object. Then, it may clear tz->debugfs after one of those functions has checked it and the struct thermal_debugfs object may be freed prematurely. To address the first problem, pass a pointer to the thermal zone's struct thermal_debugfs object to debugfs_create_file() in thermal_debug_tz_add() and make tze_seq_start(), tze_seq_next(), tze_seq_stop(), and tze_seq_show() retrieve it from s->private instead of a pointer to the thermal zone object. This will ensure that tz_debugfs will be valid across the "mitigations" file accesses until thermal_debugfs_remove_id() called by thermal_debug_tz_remove() removes that file. To address the second problem, use tz->lock in thermal_debug_tz_remove() around the tz->debugfs value check (in case the same thermal zone is removed at the same time in two different threads) and its reset to NULL. Cc :6.8+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.8+
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2024-09-10 17:15 UTC
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 7ef01f228c9f54c6260319858be138a8a7e9e704 , < 6c57bdd0505422d5ccd2df541d993aec978c842e (git)
Affected: 7ef01f228c9f54c6260319858be138a8a7e9e704 , < c7f7c37271787a7f77d7eedc132b0b419a76b4c8 (git)
Create a notification for this product.
Linux Linux Affected: 6.8
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.8 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.8.10 , ≤ 6.8.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.9 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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