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    BREW-ANSIBLE@10-CVE-2026-69247 (GHSA-G6CJ-PR64-35W5)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:35 – Updated: 2026-10-08 00:10 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing
    Details

    Summary

    pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key.

    Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

    Details

    Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

    1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
    2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
    3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
    4. the real key → plaintext

    Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels, invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming ciphertexts.

    Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

    Fix

    Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path. All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

    Not addressed by this fix

    EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in the library, and is now documented.

    Credit

    Reported by @X1AOxiang.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": null,
            "range_state": "affected",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@46.0.3",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "50.0.0"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "ansible@10",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/ansible%4010"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "10.7.0_4"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@46.0.3",
            "name": "cryptography",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "46.0.3"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`, `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of decrypting a `RecipientInfo`\u0027s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result \u2192 AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding bytes.`\n4. the real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway or mail filter.\n\n### Fix\n\nPer RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the\nprivate key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.\nAll failures now report identically and perform the same work.\n\n### Not addressed by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData` does not authenticate its content. Tampering with\n`encryptedContent` alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at\nroughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This\nis a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in\nthe library, and is now documented.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @X1AOxiang.",
      "id": "BREW-ansible@10-CVE-2026-69247",
      "modified": "2026-10-08T00:10:55Z",
      "published": "2026-08-13T16:35:22Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5",
        "CVE-2026-69247",
        "PYSEC-2026-3552"
      ]
    }

    BREW-ANSIBLE@9-CVE-2026-69247 (GHSA-G6CJ-PR64-35W5)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:35 – Updated: 2026-10-07 22:51 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing
    Details

    Summary

    pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key.

    Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

    Details

    Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

    1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
    2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
    3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
    4. the real key → plaintext

    Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels, invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming ciphertexts.

    Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

    Fix

    Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path. All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

    Not addressed by this fix

    EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in the library, and is now documented.

    Credit

    Reported by @X1AOxiang.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": null,
            "range_state": "affected",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@46.0.3",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "50.0.0"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "ansible@9",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/ansible%409"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "9.13.0_2"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@46.0.3",
            "name": "cryptography",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "46.0.3"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`, `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of decrypting a `RecipientInfo`\u0027s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result \u2192 AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding bytes.`\n4. the real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway or mail filter.\n\n### Fix\n\nPer RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the\nprivate key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.\nAll failures now report identically and perform the same work.\n\n### Not addressed by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData` does not authenticate its content. Tampering with\n`encryptedContent` alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at\nroughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This\nis a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in\nthe library, and is now documented.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @X1AOxiang.",
      "id": "BREW-ansible@9-CVE-2026-69247",
      "modified": "2026-10-07T22:51:28Z",
      "published": "2026-08-13T16:35:23Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5",
        "CVE-2026-69247",
        "PYSEC-2026-3552"
      ]
    }

    BREW-AZURE-CLI-CVE-2026-69247 (GHSA-G6CJ-PR64-35W5)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:37 – Updated: 2026-10-08 01:16 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing
    Details

    Summary

    pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key.

    Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

    Details

    Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

    1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
    2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
    3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
    4. the real key → plaintext

    Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels, invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming ciphertexts.

    Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

    Fix

    Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path. All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

    Not addressed by this fix

    EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in the library, and is now documented.

    Credit

    Reported by @X1AOxiang.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": null,
            "range_state": "affected",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@48.0.1",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "50.0.0"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "azure-cli",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/azure-cli"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "2.70.0"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@48.0.1",
            "name": "cryptography",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "48.0.1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`, `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of decrypting a `RecipientInfo`\u0027s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result \u2192 AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding bytes.`\n4. the real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway or mail filter.\n\n### Fix\n\nPer RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the\nprivate key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.\nAll failures now report identically and perform the same work.\n\n### Not addressed by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData` does not authenticate its content. Tampering with\n`encryptedContent` alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at\nroughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This\nis a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in\nthe library, and is now documented.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @X1AOxiang.",
      "id": "BREW-azure-cli-CVE-2026-69247",
      "modified": "2026-10-08T01:16:58Z",
      "published": "2026-08-13T16:37:03Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5",
        "CVE-2026-69247",
        "PYSEC-2026-3552"
      ]
    }

    BREW-CRYPTOGRAPHY-CVE-20… (CVE-2026-69247)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:41 – Updated: 2026-10-08 00:03 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing
    Details

    cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. From 44.0.0 until 50.0.0, pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key. Decryption ran as RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey, build an AES cipher from the result, then AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Invalid RSA padding, a valid padding with a bad key length, a correct length with a wrong key, and the real key each failed or succeeded differently. Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter. This issue is fixed in 50.0.0.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "50.0.0"
          },
          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "cryptography",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/cryptography"
          },
          "ranges": [
            {
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "44.0.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "50.0.0"
                }
              ],
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "git",
        "upstream_evidence": [
          {
            "ecosystem": "GIT",
            "key": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography",
            "name": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography",
            "strategy": "git",
            "subject_version": "50.0.2"
          },
          {
            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@50.0.2",
            "name": "cryptography",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "50.0.2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. From 44.0.0 until 50.0.0, pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo\u0027s encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key. Decryption ran as RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey, build an AES cipher from the result, then AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Invalid RSA padding, a valid padding with a bad key length, a correct length with a wrong key, and the real key each failed or succeeded differently. Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter. This issue is fixed in 50.0.0.",
      "id": "BREW-cryptography-CVE-2026-69247",
      "modified": "2026-10-08T00:03:43Z",
      "published": "2026-08-13T16:41:16Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/69xxx/CVE-2026-69247.json"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5"
        },
        {
          "type": "ADVISORY",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247"
        },
        {
          "type": "FIX",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f"
        },
        {
          "type": "FIX",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing",
      "upstream": [
        "CVE-2026-69247",
        "GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5",
        "PYSEC-2026-3552"
      ]
    }

    BREW-PROWLER-CVE-2026-69247 (GHSA-G6CJ-PR64-35W5)

    Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-09-30 20:14 – Updated: 2026-09-30 20:14 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing
    Details

    Summary

    pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key.

    Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

    Details

    Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

    1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
    2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
    3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
    4. the real key → plaintext

    Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels, invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming ciphertexts.

    Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

    Fix

    Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path. All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

    Not addressed by this fix

    EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in the library, and is now documented.

    Credit

    Reported by @X1AOxiang.


    {
      "affected": [
        {
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "fix": "bump",
            "range_state": "fixed",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@50.0.0",
            "upstream_fixed_in": "50.0.0"
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          "package": {
            "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
            "name": "prowler",
            "purl": "pkg:brew/prowler"
          },
          "ranges": [
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                },
                {
                  "fixed": "5.31.0"
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      "database_specific": {
        "confidence": "high",
        "source": "matched",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "upstream_evidence": [
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            "ecosystem": "PyPI",
            "key": "pkg:pypi/cryptography@50.0.0",
            "name": "cryptography",
            "resource": "cryptography",
            "strategy": "registry",
            "subject_version": "50.0.0"
          }
        ]
      },
      "details": "### Summary\n\n`pkcs7_decrypt_der`, `pkcs7_decrypt_pem`, and `pkcs7_decrypt_smime` reported the\noutcome of decrypting a `RecipientInfo`\u0027s `encryptedKey` in several\ndistinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the\nRSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An\napplication that decrypts attacker-supplied `EnvelopedData` and reflects the\noutcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the\ncontent-encryption key.\n\nIntroduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.\n\n### Details\n\nDecryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of `encryptedKey` \u2192 build an AES\ncipher from the result \u2192 AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed\ndifferently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:\n\n1. invalid RSA padding \u2192 `Decryption failed`\n2. valid padding, bad key length \u2192 `Invalid key size (N) for AES.`, disclosing `N`\n3. correct length, wrong key \u2192 `Invalid padding bytes.`\n4. the real key \u2192 plaintext\n\nCase 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection:\nOpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels,\ninvalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of\npseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming\nciphertexts.\n\nExploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted `EnvelopedData`\nmatching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as\nan S/MIME gateway or mail filter.\n\n### Fix\n\nPer RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the\nprivate key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA\ndecryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the\nexpected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path.\nAll failures now report identically and perform the same work.\n\n### Not addressed by this fix\n\n`EnvelopedData` does not authenticate its content. Tampering with\n`encryptedContent` alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at\nroughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This\nis a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in\nthe library, and is now documented.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @X1AOxiang.",
      "id": "BREW-prowler-CVE-2026-69247",
      "modified": "2026-09-30T20:14:21Z",
      "published": "2026-09-30T20:14:21Z",
      "references": [
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369"
        },
        {
          "type": "WEB",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f"
        },
        {
          "type": "PACKAGE",
          "url": "https://github.com/pyca/cryptography"
        }
      ],
      "schema_version": "1.7.3",
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ],
      "summary": "cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing",
      "upstream": [
        "GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5",
        "CVE-2026-69247",
        "PYSEC-2026-3552"
      ]
    }

    CVE-2026-69247 (GCVE-0-2026-69247)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-03 21:16 – Updated: 2026-08-04 14:09
    VLAI
    Title
    cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing
    Summary
    cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. From 44.0.0 until 50.0.0, pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key. Decryption ran as RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey, build an AES cipher from the result, then AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Invalid RSA padding, a valid padding with a bad key length, a correct length with a wrong key, and the real key each failed or succeeded differently. Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter. This issue is fixed in 50.0.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-08-04 14:09 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-208 - Observable Timing Discrepancy
    • CWE-209 - Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
    Assigner
    GitHub_M CNA
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    pyca cryptography Affected: >= 44.0.0, < 50.0.0
    Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website

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