<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from osv_homebrew</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:36:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-cloudflare-wrangler-CVE-2026-0933 — Wrangler affected by OS Command Injection in `wrangler pages deploy`</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-cloudflare-wrangler-cve-2026-0933</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: cloudflare-wrangler&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Summary**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) has been found to exist in the `wrangler pages deploy` command. The issue occurs because the `--commit-hash` parameter is passed directly to a shell command without proper validation or sanitization, allowing an attacker with control of `--commit-hash` to execute arbitrary commands on the system running Wrangler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `commitHash` variable, derived from user input via the `--commit-hash` CLI argument, is interpolated directly into a shell command using template literals (e.g., ``execSync(`git show -s --format=%B ${commitHash}`)``). Shell metacharacters are interpreted by the shell, enabling command execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Impact**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is generally hard to exploit, as it requires `--commit-hash` to be attacker controlled. The vulnerability primarily affects CI/CD environments where `wrangler pages deploy` is used in automated pipelines and the `--commit-hash` parameter is populated from external, potentially untrusted sources. An attacker could exploit this to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Run any shell command.
- Exfiltrate environment variables.
- Compromise the CI runner to install backdoors or modify build artifacts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Mitigation**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Wrangler v4 users are requested to upgrade to Wrangler v4.59.1 or higher. 
- Wrangler v3 users are requested to upgrade to Wrangler v3.114.17 or higher. 
- Users on Wrangler v2 (EOL) should upgrade to a supported major version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Credits**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Disclosed responsibly by kny4hacker.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: cloudflare-wrangler&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Summary**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) has been found to exist in the `wrangler pages deploy` command. The issue occurs because the `--commit-hash` parameter is passed directly to a shell command without proper validation or sanitization, allowing an attacker with control of `--commit-hash` to execute arbitrary commands on the system running Wrangler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `commitHash` variable, derived from user input via the `--commit-hash` CLI argument, is interpolated directly into a shell command using template literals (e.g., ``execSync(`git show -s --format=%B ${commitHash}`)``). Shell metacharacters are interpreted by the shell, enabling command execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Impact**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is generally hard to exploit, as it requires `--commit-hash` to be attacker controlled. The vulnerability primarily affects CI/CD environments where `wrangler pages deploy` is used in automated pipelines and the `--commit-hash` parameter is populated from external, potentially untrusted sources. An attacker could exploit this to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Run any shell command.
- Exfiltrate environment variables.
- Compromise the CI runner to install backdoors or modify build artifacts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Mitigation**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Wrangler v4 users are requested to upgrade to Wrangler v4.59.1 or higher. 
- Wrangler v3 users are requested to upgrade to Wrangler v3.114.17 or higher. 
- Users on Wrangler v2 (EOL) should upgrade to a supported major version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Credits**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Disclosed responsibly by kny4hacker.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-cloudflare-wrangler-cve-2026-0933</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 16:40:09 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-vdirsyncer-GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5 — aiohttp: Multiple instances of excessive or unbounded memory/CPU use</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-vdirsyncer-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: vdirsyncer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: vdirsyncer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-vdirsyncer-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:38:26 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-scrapy-GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5 — aiohttp: Multiple instances of excessive or unbounded memory/CPU use</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-scrapy-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: scrapy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: scrapy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-scrapy-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 10:21:06 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-ssh-mitm-GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5 — aiohttp: Multiple instances of excessive or unbounded memory/CPU use</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-ssh-mitm-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ssh-mitm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ssh-mitm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-ssh-mitm-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 10:54:31 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-scoutsuite-GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5 — aiohttp: Multiple instances of excessive or unbounded memory/CPU use</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-scoutsuite-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: scoutsuite&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: scoutsuite&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-scoutsuite-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 10:42:20 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-pferd-GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5 — aiohttp: Multiple instances of excessive or unbounded memory/CPU use</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-pferd-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: pferd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: pferd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While reassembling a WebSocket frame that arrived across many small transport reads, the reader kept one `bytes` object per read with no bound on the count. The per-object overhead is many times larger than the payload bytes, so a frame delivered a few bytes at a time could use far more memory than `max_msg_size` allows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could cause excessive memory use in a WebSocket server, or a malicious server against a client, by sending a frame in a large number of tiny segments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-pferd-ghsa-2g87-pp6c-29x5</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 10:58:34 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-virtualenvwrapper-CVE-2026-113776 — virtualenv activation scripts run code from a path that contains a placeholder name</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113776</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template` replaces the placeholders in an activation template one key at a time, each across the whole text. When a value that it already substituted and quoted contains the name of a later placeholder, the later pass rewrites that name inside the quoted literal. The inserted value brings its own quotes, which close the outer literal, and the rest of the path runs as code when a user activates the environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`__VIRTUAL_NAME__` holds the environment&amp;#39;s directory name, so a destination such as `A__VIRTUAL_NAME__B/x&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;y` is enough. In the default `activate` for bash, the `VIRTUAL_ENV` line renders as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```sh
VIRTUAL_ENV=&amp;#39;/tmp/t/A&amp;#39;x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;B/x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sourcing that script runs `touch PWNED`. The same payload in a path without the placeholder name runs nothing. `activate.fish` runs the command the same way, and the reporter also showed Python code execution through `activate.xsh` and `bin/activate_this.py`. In `activate.csh`, a directory named after a prompt display placeholder, such as `__VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__`, breaks the script with `Unmatched &amp;#39;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No change to `quote()` can stop this, because the rewrite happens after `quote()` ran; it defeats `shlex.quote` and `repr()` alike.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker needs to influence the destination path or `--prompt`: a CI job or wrapper tool that builds the path from a branch or project name, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpack…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template` replaces the placeholders in an activation template one key at a time, each across the whole text. When a value that it already substituted and quoted contains the name of a later placeholder, the later pass rewrites that name inside the quoted literal. The inserted value brings its own quotes, which close the outer literal, and the rest of the path runs as code when a user activates the environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`__VIRTUAL_NAME__` holds the environment&amp;#39;s directory name, so a destination such as `A__VIRTUAL_NAME__B/x&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;y` is enough. In the default `activate` for bash, the `VIRTUAL_ENV` line renders as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```sh
VIRTUAL_ENV=&amp;#39;/tmp/t/A&amp;#39;x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;B/x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sourcing that script runs `touch PWNED`. The same payload in a path without the placeholder name runs nothing. `activate.fish` runs the command the same way, and the reporter also showed Python code execution through `activate.xsh` and `bin/activate_this.py`. In `activate.csh`, a directory named after a prompt display placeholder, such as `__VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__`, breaks the script with `Unmatched &amp;#39;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No change to `quote()` can stop this, because the rewrite happens after `quote()` ran; it defeats `shlex.quote` and `repr()` alike.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker needs to influence the destination path or `--prompt`: a CI job or wrapper tool that builds the path from a branch or project name, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpack…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113776</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 11:13:48 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-virtualenvwrapper-CVE-2026-113732 — virtualenv activate.fish runs commands from a path or prompt with a backslash before a quote</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113732</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`FishActivator` defines no `quote()`, so it inherits `ViaTemplateActivator.quote`, which returns `shlex.quote(string)`. That function follows POSIX `sh` rules, where a backslash inside single quotes stays a literal character. fish reads `\&amp;#39;` inside single quotes as an escaped quote and `\\` as an escaped backslash. A value with a backslash before a quote therefore ends the literal somewhere other than where `shlex.quote` put the end, and fish expands the command substitution that follows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The environment path reaches `set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV`, and `--prompt` or `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` reaches `set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT`. For `--prompt &amp;#34;x\&amp;#39;\$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;\&amp;#39;&amp;#34;`, the generated `activate.fish` contains:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```fish
set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT &amp;#39;x\&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;\&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`source bin/activate.fish` runs `touch PWNED`, and fish prints no error. The same payload as a directory name runs through `VIRTUAL_ENV`. `--prompt .` takes the current directory&amp;#39;s name, so running virtualenv inside a directory someone else named is enough. Without the backslash the payload runs nothing, and under bash it runs nothing either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv generates `activate.fish` by default. An attacker needs to influence the environment path or prompt: a CI job or wrapper tool that passes a branch, project or job name through, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpacked archive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug affects every release up to 21.14.1 that ships `activate.fish`. The GHSA-p58f-9548-mpm2 fix in 21.7.13 mov…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`FishActivator` defines no `quote()`, so it inherits `ViaTemplateActivator.quote`, which returns `shlex.quote(string)`. That function follows POSIX `sh` rules, where a backslash inside single quotes stays a literal character. fish reads `\&amp;#39;` inside single quotes as an escaped quote and `\\` as an escaped backslash. A value with a backslash before a quote therefore ends the literal somewhere other than where `shlex.quote` put the end, and fish expands the command substitution that follows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The environment path reaches `set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV`, and `--prompt` or `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` reaches `set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT`. For `--prompt &amp;#34;x\&amp;#39;\$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;\&amp;#39;&amp;#34;`, the generated `activate.fish` contains:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```fish
set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT &amp;#39;x\&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;\&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`source bin/activate.fish` runs `touch PWNED`, and fish prints no error. The same payload as a directory name runs through `VIRTUAL_ENV`. `--prompt .` takes the current directory&amp;#39;s name, so running virtualenv inside a directory someone else named is enough. Without the backslash the payload runs nothing, and under bash it runs nothing either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv generates `activate.fish` by default. An attacker needs to influence the environment path or prompt: a CI job or wrapper tool that passes a branch, project or job name through, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpacked archive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug affects every release up to 21.14.1 that ships `activate.fish`. The GHSA-p58f-9548-mpm2 fix in 21.7.13 mov…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113732</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 11:13:48 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-virtualenvwrapper-CVE-2026-113726 — virtualenv activate runs commands from the environment name in zsh with PROMPT_SUBST</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113726</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;zsh users activate an environment with the bash `activate` script, which puts the environment name into `PS1`. Since
21.13.0 the script escapes backslashes, dollar signs and backticks in that name, but only when `BASH_VERSION` is set, so
zsh gets the raw value. With the `PROMPT_SUBST` option set, zsh runs parameter expansion, command substitution and
arithmetic expansion on `PS1` each time it draws the prompt. A name that contains `$(...)`, backticks or `${...}` then
runs as commands in the user&amp;#39;s shell, once per prompt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The name comes from the environment directory, or from `--prompt` or `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT`. After you create an
environment with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```console
$ virtualenv &amp;#39;x$(touch PWNED)y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`source &amp;#39;x$(touch PWNED)y/bin/activate&amp;#39;` in a zsh session with `PROMPT_SUBST` set creates `PWNED`, and the prompt shows
`(xy)`. Passing that value as `--prompt` to an environment with a plain name has the same effect. Without
`PROMPT_SUBST`, zsh shows the name as text and runs nothing. bash runs nothing either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A plain zsh starts with `PROMPT_SUBST` off. oh-my-zsh users have it on: oh-my-zsh loads
[`lib/theme-and-appearance.zsh`](https://github.com/ohmyzsh/ohmyzsh/blob/4d4cfc287e9d887b81242c0e431b5f49f9cec5c1/lib/theme-and-appearance.zsh#L5)
at startup, and that file sets it. An attacker needs to influence the environment path or prompt: a CI job or wrapper
tool that passes a branch, project or job name through, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpacked archive.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;zsh users activate an environment with the bash `activate` script, which puts the environment name into `PS1`. Since
21.13.0 the script escapes backslashes, dollar signs and backticks in that name, but only when `BASH_VERSION` is set, so
zsh gets the raw value. With the `PROMPT_SUBST` option set, zsh runs parameter expansion, command substitution and
arithmetic expansion on `PS1` each time it draws the prompt. A name that contains `$(...)`, backticks or `${...}` then
runs as commands in the user&amp;#39;s shell, once per prompt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The name comes from the environment directory, or from `--prompt` or `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT`. After you create an
environment with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```console
$ virtualenv &amp;#39;x$(touch PWNED)y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`source &amp;#39;x$(touch PWNED)y/bin/activate&amp;#39;` in a zsh session with `PROMPT_SUBST` set creates `PWNED`, and the prompt shows
`(xy)`. Passing that value as `--prompt` to an environment with a plain name has the same effect. Without
`PROMPT_SUBST`, zsh shows the name as text and runs nothing. bash runs nothing either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A plain zsh starts with `PROMPT_SUBST` off. oh-my-zsh users have it on: oh-my-zsh loads
[`lib/theme-and-appearance.zsh`](https://github.com/ohmyzsh/ohmyzsh/blob/4d4cfc287e9d887b81242c0e431b5f49f9cec5c1/lib/theme-and-appearance.zsh#L5)
at startup, and that file sets it. An attacker needs to influence the environment path or prompt: a CI job or wrapper
tool that passes a branch, project or job name through, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpacked archive.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113726</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 11:13:48 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-virtualenvwrapper-CVE-2026-113725 — virtualenv bash activate runs commands from an environment name with a backslash before $</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113725</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bash `activate` script escapes the environment name for only one of the two passes bash makes over `PS1`, so a
backslash in the name undoes the escaping and a name containing `\$(...)` runs as commands in the user&amp;#39;s shell each
time bash draws the prompt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected area&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/virtualenv/activation/bash/activate.sh`, the block that prepends the environment name to `PS1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attacker-controlled input&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The environment name: the environment directory&amp;#39;s name, or the `--prompt` or `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` value. An attacker
needs to influence it, for example through a CI job or wrapper tool that passes a branch, project or job name through,
or a directory in a cloned repository or unpacked archive. `--prompt .` takes the current directory&amp;#39;s name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bash handles `PS1` in two passes each time it draws the prompt: it first decodes backslash prompt escapes, turning `\\`
into `\` and `\$` into `$` (or `#` for root), and then runs parameter expansion, command substitution and arithmetic
expansion on the result. Since 21.13.0 the script escapes backslashes, dollar signs and backticks in the name, but only
for the second pass, so the decode pass strips the escaping that a backslash in the name precedes. Releases before
21.13.0 do not escape the name at all. A bash running as root decodes `\$` to `#`, so the payload shows the wrong text
there but runs nothing. zsh does no decode pass and is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```console
$ virtualenv --prompt &amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: virtualenvwrapper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bash `activate` script escapes the environment name for only one of the two passes bash makes over `PS1`, so a
backslash in the name undoes the escaping and a name containing `\$(...)` runs as commands in the user&amp;#39;s shell each
time bash draws the prompt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected area&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/virtualenv/activation/bash/activate.sh`, the block that prepends the environment name to `PS1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attacker-controlled input&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The environment name: the environment directory&amp;#39;s name, or the `--prompt` or `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` value. An attacker
needs to influence it, for example through a CI job or wrapper tool that passes a branch, project or job name through,
or a directory in a cloned repository or unpacked archive. `--prompt .` takes the current directory&amp;#39;s name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bash handles `PS1` in two passes each time it draws the prompt: it first decodes backslash prompt escapes, turning `\\`
into `\` and `\$` into `$` (or `#` for root), and then runs parameter expansion, command substitution and arithmetic
expansion on the result. Since 21.13.0 the script escapes backslashes, dollar signs and backticks in the name, but only
for the second pass, so the decode pass strips the escaping that a backslash in the name precedes. Releases before
21.13.0 do not escape the name at all. A bash running as root decodes `\$` to `#`, so the payload shows the wrong text
there but runs nothing. zsh does no decode pass and is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```console
$ virtualenv --prompt &amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/brew-virtualenvwrapper-cve-2026-113725</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 11:13:48 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
