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      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89628</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89628</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89628</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89628</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp-&amp;gt;raw_data[2] -- a length byte supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to the caller&amp;#39;s read() count: 	ret = resp-&amp;gt;raw_data[2]; 	if (ret &amp;gt; s) 		ret = s; 	if (copy_to_user(u, resp-&amp;gt;raw_data+3, ret)) It never checks resp-&amp;gt;raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event() actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc&amp;#39;d struct picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte of 0xff, read with a count &amp;gt;= 255, makes copy_to_user() read past raw_data[] into adjacent slab memory and return it to userspace through the debugfs &amp;#34;eeprom&amp;#34; file: 	BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user 	Read of size 255 ... picolcd_debug_eeprom_read+0x214/0x2f0 [hid_picolcd] The debug-dump path in the same file already validates the device length byte against the received size before trusting it; this read does not. The file is created S_IRUSR (root-only) and a crafted device is needed, so it is neither unprivileged- nor remotely-triggerable. Clamp the copy length to resp-&amp;gt;raw_size - 3 (the payload actually received, minus the 3-byte header), floored at 0 for short replies.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp-&amp;gt;raw_data[2] -- a length byte supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to the caller&amp;#39;s read() count: 	ret = resp-&amp;gt;raw_data[2]; 	if (ret &amp;gt; s) 		ret = s; 	if (copy_to_user(u, resp-&amp;gt;raw_data+3, ret)) It never checks resp-&amp;gt;raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event() actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc&amp;#39;d struct picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte of 0xff, read with a count &amp;gt;= 255, makes copy_to_user() read past raw_data[] into adjacent slab memory and return it to userspace through the debugfs &amp;#34;eeprom&amp;#34; file: 	BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user 	Read of size 255 ... picolcd_debug_eeprom_read+0x214/0x2f0 [hid_picolcd] The debug-dump path in the same file already validates the device length byte against the received size before trusting it; this read does not. The file is created S_IRUSR (root-only) and a crafted device is needed, so it is neither unprivileged- nor remotely-triggerable. Clamp the copy length to resp-&amp;gt;raw_size - 3 (the payload actually received, minus the 3-byte header), floored at 0 for short replies.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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