<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 14:45:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-89493</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89493</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-89493</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1253 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1253</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-89493</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89493</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array with: 	for (; i &amp;lt; le16_to_cpu(rb-&amp;gt;rf_records.rl_used); i++) { 		rec = &amp;amp;rb-&amp;gt;rf_records.rl_recs[i]; 		... rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the 16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec).  rl_used and rl_count are both read directly off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW operation walks the array. A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i] for i up to 65534.  The resulting index is then handed to the sibling ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does: 	if (index &amp;lt; le16_to_cpu(rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_used)) 		memmove(&amp;amp;rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_recs[index + 1], 			&amp;amp;rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_recs[index], 			(le16_to_cpu(rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_used) - index) * 			 sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec)); i.e.  a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an offset already past the block.  This is reachable from an ordinary reflink (FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array with: 	for (; i &amp;lt; le16_to_cpu(rb-&amp;gt;rf_records.rl_used); i++) { 		rec = &amp;amp;rb-&amp;gt;rf_records.rl_recs[i]; 		... rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the 16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec).  rl_used and rl_count are both read directly off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW operation walks the array. A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i] for i up to 65534.  The resulting index is then handed to the sibling ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does: 	if (index &amp;lt; le16_to_cpu(rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_used)) 		memmove(&amp;amp;rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_recs[index + 1], 			&amp;amp;rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_recs[index], 			(le16_to_cpu(rf_list-&amp;gt;rl_used) - index) * 			 sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec)); i.e.  a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an offset already past the block.  This is reachable from an ordinary reflink (FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-89493</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
