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      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-74472</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74472</guid>
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      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1090 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1090</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74472</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 155 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev() ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into ub-&amp;gt;dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses -&amp;gt;state and -&amp;gt;ublksrv_pid. A device added with -&amp;gt;state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the &amp;#34;-&amp;gt;state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD&amp;#34; test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its proxy for &amp;#34;a disk is attached&amp;#34;, while -&amp;gt;ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk().  UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev().  A poisoned -&amp;gt;state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV at -EEXIST.  A poisoned -&amp;gt;ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an unrelated task as the ublk server. Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does.  Userspace only ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing. ADD_DEV has copied -&amp;gt;state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than -&amp;gt;state.  The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to START_DEV and those checks switched to -&amp;gt;state.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 155 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev() ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into ub-&amp;gt;dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses -&amp;gt;state and -&amp;gt;ublksrv_pid. A device added with -&amp;gt;state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the &amp;#34;-&amp;gt;state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD&amp;#34; test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its proxy for &amp;#34;a disk is attached&amp;#34;, while -&amp;gt;ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk().  UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev().  A poisoned -&amp;gt;state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV at -EEXIST.  A poisoned -&amp;gt;ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an unrelated task as the ublk server. Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does.  Userspace only ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing. ADD_DEV has copied -&amp;gt;state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than -&amp;gt;state.  The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to START_DEV and those checks switched to -&amp;gt;state.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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