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      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-72196</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72196</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1286 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1286</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1286</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1286</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72196</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72196</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 194 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp-&amp;gt;page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()&amp;#39;s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow further entries: 	t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow); 	for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; t16; i++) { 	    size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh-&amp;gt;target_vcn) - 	                        le64_to_cpu(dp-&amp;gt;vcn)); 	    dp-&amp;gt;page_lcns[j + i] = lrh-&amp;gt;page_lcns[i]; 	} find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp-&amp;gt;vcn, dp-&amp;gt;vcn + dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered.  The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow.  For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp-&amp;gt;vcn + dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow - 1 and lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow &amp;gt; 1, the i &amp;gt; 0 writes overflow the dp&amp;#39;s allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow &amp;lt;= dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha&amp;#39;s 2026-05-02 patch (&amp;#34;fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion&amp;#34;, &amp;lt;20260502154252.164586-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com&amp;gt;) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path&amp;#39;s memmove(&amp;amp;dp-&amp;gt;vcn, ...) call.  The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes, fixed…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 194 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp-&amp;gt;page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()&amp;#39;s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow further entries: 	t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow); 	for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; t16; i++) { 	    size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh-&amp;gt;target_vcn) - 	                        le64_to_cpu(dp-&amp;gt;vcn)); 	    dp-&amp;gt;page_lcns[j + i] = lrh-&amp;gt;page_lcns[i]; 	} find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp-&amp;gt;vcn, dp-&amp;gt;vcn + dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered.  The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow.  For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp-&amp;gt;vcn + dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow - 1 and lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow &amp;gt; 1, the i &amp;gt; 0 writes overflow the dp&amp;#39;s allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh-&amp;gt;lcns_follow &amp;lt;= dp-&amp;gt;lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha&amp;#39;s 2026-05-02 patch (&amp;#34;fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion&amp;#34;, &amp;lt;20260502154252.164586-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com&amp;gt;) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path&amp;#39;s memmove(&amp;amp;dp-&amp;gt;vcn, ...) call.  The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes, fixed…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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