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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 07:44:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-68160</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68160</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68160</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1069 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1069</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3531 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-3531</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() /…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() /…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-3531</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-68160</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-68160</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:     snaptrace     = h + 1;     snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);     p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;     ...     case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:         if (snaptrace_len) {             ...             if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,                                        snaptrace + snaptrace_len,                                        false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps / ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 248 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:     snaptrace     = h + 1;     snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);     p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;     ...     case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:         if (snaptrace_len) {             ...             if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,                                        snaptrace + snaptrace_len,                                        false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps / ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-68160</guid>
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