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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 06:53:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-68095</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68095</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68095</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1286 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1286</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1286</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1286</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3987 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-3987</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev-&amp;amp;gt;sent_cmd) when a connection
was pending, but hdev-&amp;amp;gt;sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still
HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general
protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead of inspecting hdev-&amp;amp;gt;sent_cmd, track the in-flight create
connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and
route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which
dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command
is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel
function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker
takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued
command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete
and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and
hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued
command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this
connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated
command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag
mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync()…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev-&amp;amp;gt;sent_cmd) when a connection
was pending, but hdev-&amp;amp;gt;sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still
HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general
protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Instead of inspecting hdev-&amp;amp;gt;sent_cmd, track the in-flight create
connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and
route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which
dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command
is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel
function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker
takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued
command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete
and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and
hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued
command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this
connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated
command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag
mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync()…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-3987</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-68095</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-68095</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion This fixes this race: - thread a: io_uring_enter -&amp;gt; register sqe -&amp;gt;   fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -&amp;gt; allocate ent but doesn&amp;#39;t grab queue_ref   yet - thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -&amp;gt; fuse_chan_abort() -&amp;gt;   fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0 - thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of   fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes - thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs   and calls   &amp;#34;wait_event(ring-&amp;gt;stop_waitq, atomic_read(&amp;amp;ring-&amp;gt;queue_refs) == 0);&amp;#34; The abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as nothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring, queue, and ent are leaked. Fix this by checking fch-&amp;gt;connected under fch-&amp;gt;lock after the created ent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the scenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref and wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already waiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch-&amp;gt;connected, or if the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the async teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents and decrementing the ent&amp;#39;s ref on the queue, which will unblock the eventual queue and ring teardown.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion This fixes this race: - thread a: io_uring_enter -&amp;gt; register sqe -&amp;gt;   fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -&amp;gt; allocate ent but doesn&amp;#39;t grab queue_ref   yet - thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -&amp;gt; fuse_chan_abort() -&amp;gt;   fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0 - thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of   fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes - thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs   and calls   &amp;#34;wait_event(ring-&amp;gt;stop_waitq, atomic_read(&amp;amp;ring-&amp;gt;queue_refs) == 0);&amp;#34; The abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as nothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring, queue, and ent are leaked. Fix this by checking fch-&amp;gt;connected under fch-&amp;gt;lock after the created ent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the scenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref and wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already waiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch-&amp;gt;connected, or if the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the async teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents and decrementing the ent&amp;#39;s ref on the queue, which will unblock the eventual queue and ring teardown.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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