<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 07:56:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-43472</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-43472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-43472</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0696 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0696</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0696</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0696</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-2493 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-2493</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In flush_write_buffer, &amp;amp;amp;p-&amp;amp;gt;frag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store
function is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store().  This
function called filp_open(), following which these functions were called
(in reverse order), according to the call trace:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;down_read
  __configfs_open_file
  do_dentry_open
  vfs_open
  do_open
  path_openat
  do_filp_open
  file_open_name
  filp_open
  target_core_item_dbroot_store
  flush_write_buffer
  configfs_write_iter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;target_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by
trying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug
report shows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;db_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;indicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it
is currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore
of the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in
flush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner
and a possibility of recursive locking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path()
instead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific
function __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix
compatible.(CVE-2026-23292)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In flush_write_buffer, &amp;amp;amp;p-&amp;amp;gt;frag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store
function is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store().  This
function called filp_open(), following which these functions were called
(in reverse order), according to the call trace:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;down_read
  __configfs_open_file
  do_dentry_open
  vfs_open
  do_open
  path_openat
  do_filp_open
  file_open_name
  filp_open
  target_core_item_dbroot_store
  flush_write_buffer
  configfs_write_iter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;target_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by
trying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug
report shows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;db_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;indicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it
is currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore
of the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in
flush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner
and a possibility of recursive locking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path()
instead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific
function __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix
compatible.(CVE-2026-23292)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-2493</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-43472</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-43472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 234 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling There&amp;#39;s an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current-&amp;gt;fs hadn&amp;#39;t been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current-&amp;gt;fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness] &amp;gt; I guess if private means fs-&amp;gt;users == 1, the condition could still be true. Unfortunately, it&amp;#39;s worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;users == 1). We pass current-&amp;gt;fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right.  Suppose it succeeds and flips current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it&amp;#39;s destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but...  current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;root and current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts. They are pinning those, so it&amp;#39;s not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts.  The last part is clearly a bug. There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as &amp;#34;allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn&amp;#39;t b…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 234 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling There&amp;#39;s an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current-&amp;gt;fs hadn&amp;#39;t been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current-&amp;gt;fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness] &amp;gt; I guess if private means fs-&amp;gt;users == 1, the condition could still be true. Unfortunately, it&amp;#39;s worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;users == 1). We pass current-&amp;gt;fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right.  Suppose it succeeds and flips current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it&amp;#39;s destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but...  current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;root and current-&amp;gt;fs-&amp;gt;pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts. They are pinning those, so it&amp;#39;s not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts.  The last part is clearly a bug. There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as &amp;#34;allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn&amp;#39;t b…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-43472</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
