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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 23:52:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>ALSA-2026:33285 — Important: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/alsa-2026:33285</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AlmaLinux:9: kernel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel-matched, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-extra and 64 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* kernel: net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() (CVE-2026-31411)
  * kernel: tcp: fix potential race in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() (CVE-2026-43198)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* [AlmaLinux 9.8 Bug] qla2xxx flash image validation failure [almalinux-9.8.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-181886)
  * crypto: testmgr - allow authenc(hmac(sha{256,384}),cts(cbc(aes))) in FIPS mode [almalinux-9.8.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-182540)
  * tegra-se fixes and updates [almalinux-9.8.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-182760)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AlmaLinux:9: kernel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel-matched, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-extra and 64 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* kernel: net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() (CVE-2026-31411)
  * kernel: tcp: fix potential race in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() (CVE-2026-43198)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* [AlmaLinux 9.8 Bug] qla2xxx flash image validation failure [almalinux-9.8.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-181886)
  * crypto: testmgr - allow authenc(hmac(sha{256,384}),cts(cbc(aes))) in FIPS mode [almalinux-9.8.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-182540)
  * tegra-se fixes and updates [almalinux-9.8.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-182760)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/alsa-2026:33285</guid>
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      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-31411</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-31411</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-31411</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0547 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0547</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0547</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0547</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-31411</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-31411</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 233 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() Reproducer available at [1]. The ATM send path (sendmsg -&amp;gt; vcc_sendmsg -&amp;gt; sigd_send) reads the vcc pointer from msg-&amp;gt;vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged:     int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);     ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL);  // become ATM signaling daemon     struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &amp;amp;iov, ... };     *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef;  // fake vcc pointer     sendmsg(fd, &amp;amp;msg, 0);  // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(), or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values. Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found. Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to keep the vcc alive while it is being used. Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns. However, sock…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 233 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() Reproducer available at [1]. The ATM send path (sendmsg -&amp;gt; vcc_sendmsg -&amp;gt; sigd_send) reads the vcc pointer from msg-&amp;gt;vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged:     int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);     ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL);  // become ATM signaling daemon     struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &amp;amp;iov, ... };     *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef;  // fake vcc pointer     sendmsg(fd, &amp;amp;msg, 0);  // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(), or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values. Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found. Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to keep the vcc alive while it is being used. Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns. However, sock…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-31411</guid>
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