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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 22:47:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-23346</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23346</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23346</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0697 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0697</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0697</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0697</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-2868 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-2868</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()
implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; value
determined from the user mapping of the target &amp;amp;apos;pfn&amp;amp;apos; being accessed by
the kernel. On arm64, the &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; contains all of the non-address
bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up
returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when
accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000
  | ...
  | Call trace:
  |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8
  |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8
  |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8
  |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30
  |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8
  |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0
  |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178
  |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extract only the memory type from the user &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; in ioremap_prot()
and assert that we&amp;amp;apos;re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against
any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid
falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro
which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().(CVE-2026-23346)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ice: change…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()
implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; value
determined from the user mapping of the target &amp;amp;apos;pfn&amp;amp;apos; being accessed by
the kernel. On arm64, the &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; contains all of the non-address
bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up
returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when
accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000
  | ...
  | Call trace:
  |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8
  |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8
  |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8
  |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30
  |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8
  |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0
  |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178
  |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extract only the memory type from the user &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; in ioremap_prot()
and assert that we&amp;amp;apos;re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against
any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid
falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro
which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().(CVE-2026-23346)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ice: change…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-2868</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-23346</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23346</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 142 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot() The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap() implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a &amp;#39;pgprot_t&amp;#39; value determined from the user mapping of the target &amp;#39;pfn&amp;#39; being accessed by the kernel. On arm64, the &amp;#39;pgprot_t&amp;#39; contains all of the non-address bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:   | Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000   | ...   | Call trace:   |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8   |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8   |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8   |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30   |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8   |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0   |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178   |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68 Extract only the memory type from the user &amp;#39;pgprot_t&amp;#39; in ioremap_prot() and assert that we&amp;#39;re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 142 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot() The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap() implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a &amp;#39;pgprot_t&amp;#39; value determined from the user mapping of the target &amp;#39;pfn&amp;#39; being accessed by the kernel. On arm64, the &amp;#39;pgprot_t&amp;#39; contains all of the non-address bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:   | Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000   | ...   | Call trace:   |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8   |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8   |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8   |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30   |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8   |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0   |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178   |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68 Extract only the memory type from the user &amp;#39;pgprot_t&amp;#39; in ioremap_prot() and assert that we&amp;#39;re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23346</guid>
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