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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 04:08:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>BELL-CVE-2025-68282</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2025-68282</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2025-68282</guid>
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      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0057 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0057</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0057</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0057</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-1566 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-1566</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;udp: Deal with race between UDP socket address change and rehash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a UDP socket changes its local address while it&amp;amp;apos;s receiving
datagrams, as a result of connect(), there is a period during which
a lookup operation might fail to find it, after the address is changed
but before the secondary hash (port and address) and the four-tuple
hash (local and remote ports and addresses) are updated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Secondary hash chains were introduced by commit 30fff9231fad (&amp;amp;quot;udp:
bind() optimisation&amp;amp;quot;) and, as a result, a rehash operation became
needed to make a bound socket reachable again after a connect().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This operation was introduced by commit 719f835853a9 (&amp;amp;quot;udp: add
rehash on connect()&amp;amp;quot;) which isn&amp;amp;apos;t however a complete fix: the
socket will be found once the rehashing completes, but not while
it&amp;amp;apos;s pending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is noticeable with a socat(1) server in UDP4-LISTEN mode, and a
client sending datagrams to it. After the server receives the first
datagram (cf. _xioopen_ipdgram_listen()), it issues a connect() to
the address of the sender, in order to set up a directed flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, if the client, running on a different CPU thread, happens to
send a (subsequent) datagram while the server&amp;amp;apos;s socket changes its
address, but is not rehashed yet, this will result in a failed
lookup and a port unreachable error delivered to the…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;udp: Deal with race between UDP socket address change and rehash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a UDP socket changes its local address while it&amp;amp;apos;s receiving
datagrams, as a result of connect(), there is a period during which
a lookup operation might fail to find it, after the address is changed
but before the secondary hash (port and address) and the four-tuple
hash (local and remote ports and addresses) are updated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Secondary hash chains were introduced by commit 30fff9231fad (&amp;amp;quot;udp:
bind() optimisation&amp;amp;quot;) and, as a result, a rehash operation became
needed to make a bound socket reachable again after a connect().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This operation was introduced by commit 719f835853a9 (&amp;amp;quot;udp: add
rehash on connect()&amp;amp;quot;) which isn&amp;amp;apos;t however a complete fix: the
socket will be found once the rehashing completes, but not while
it&amp;amp;apos;s pending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is noticeable with a socat(1) server in UDP4-LISTEN mode, and a
client sending datagrams to it. After the server receives the first
datagram (cf. _xioopen_ipdgram_listen()), it issues a connect() to
the address of the sender, in order to set up a directed flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, if the client, running on a different CPU thread, happens to
send a (subsequent) datagram while the server&amp;amp;apos;s socket changes its
address, but is not rehashed yet, this will result in a failed
lookup and a port unreachable error delivered to the…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2026-1566</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-68282</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-68282</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 232 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:   BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0   Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget-&amp;gt;work at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget(). Commit 399a45e5237c (&amp;#34;usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal&amp;#34;) attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but before the gadget&amp;#39;s memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free. This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a &amp;#39;teardown&amp;#39; flag and a &amp;#39;state_lock&amp;#39; spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced. The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 232 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:   BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0   Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget-&amp;gt;work at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget(). Commit 399a45e5237c (&amp;#34;usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal&amp;#34;) attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but before the gadget&amp;#39;s memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free. This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a &amp;#39;teardown&amp;#39; flag and a &amp;#39;state_lock&amp;#39; spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced. The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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