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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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      <title>BELL-CVE-2024-53047</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-53047</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-53047</guid>
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      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0106 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits IBM. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un attaquan…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0106</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0106</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0106</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2024-2492 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-2492</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking  Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it *and* potentially adjusting offset.  To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction history. We don&amp;amp;apos;t touch idx field for maximum performance, as it&amp;amp;apos;s checked most frequently during backtracking.  This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of verified states, explored in the subsequent patches.  There are only three differences in selftests&amp;amp;apos; BPF object files according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states).  File                                    Program        Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns  (DIFF)  States (A)  States (B)  States (DIFF) --------------------------------------  -------------  ---------  ---------  -------------  ----------  ----------  ------------- test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking  Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it *and* potentially adjusting offset.  To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction history. We don&amp;amp;apos;t touch idx field for maximum performance, as it&amp;amp;apos;s checked most frequently during backtracking.  This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of verified states, explored in the subsequent patches.  There are only three differences in selftests&amp;amp;apos; BPF object files according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states).  File                                    Program        Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns  (DIFF)  States (A)  States (B)  States (DIFF) --------------------------------------  -------------  ---------  ---------  -------------  ----------  ----------  ------------- test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-2492</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2024-53047</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-53047</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 103 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: init: protect sched with rcu_read_lock Enabling CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST with its dependence CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT creates this splat when an MPTCP socket is created:   =============================   WARNING: suspicious RCU usage   6.12.0-rc2+ #11 Not tainted   -----------------------------   net/mptcp/sched.c:44 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!   other info that might help us debug this:   rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1   no locks held by mptcp_connect/176.   stack backtrace:   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 176 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #11   Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011   Call Trace:    &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;    dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)    lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)    mptcp_sched_find (net/mptcp/sched.c:44 (discriminator 7))    mptcp_init_sock (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2867 (discriminator 1))    ? sock_init_data_uid (arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:28)    inet_create.part.0.constprop.0 (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:386)    ? __sock_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 (discriminator 1))    __sock_create (net/socket.c:1576)    __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1671)    ? __pfx___sys_socket (net/socket.c:1712)    ? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1419 (discriminator 1))    __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1728)    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1))    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) That&amp;#39;s beca…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 103 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: init: protect sched with rcu_read_lock Enabling CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST with its dependence CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT creates this splat when an MPTCP socket is created:   =============================   WARNING: suspicious RCU usage   6.12.0-rc2+ #11 Not tainted   -----------------------------   net/mptcp/sched.c:44 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!   other info that might help us debug this:   rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1   no locks held by mptcp_connect/176.   stack backtrace:   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 176 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #11   Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011   Call Trace:    &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;    dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)    lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)    mptcp_sched_find (net/mptcp/sched.c:44 (discriminator 7))    mptcp_init_sock (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2867 (discriminator 1))    ? sock_init_data_uid (arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:28)    inet_create.part.0.constprop.0 (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:386)    ? __sock_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 (discriminator 1))    __sock_create (net/socket.c:1576)    __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1671)    ? __pfx___sys_socket (net/socket.c:1712)    ? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1419 (discriminator 1))    __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1728)    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1))    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) That&amp;#39;s beca…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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