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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 04:54:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2024-50164</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-50164</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-50164</guid>
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      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0134 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0134</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0134</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0134</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2024-2522 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-2522</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked&#13;
&#13;
When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and
only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an
NMI.  KVM&amp;amp;apos;s ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM&amp;amp;apos;s point of
view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other.  When using vNMI, KVM pends
the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the
rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).&#13;
&#13;
However, if KVM can&amp;amp;apos;t immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is
in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI
window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).&#13;
&#13;
Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of
KVM&amp;amp;apos;s behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real
hardware as possible.  E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the
probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low
on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g.
if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow.  For GIF=0, the argument isn&amp;amp;apos;t
as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger
in bare metal (though still small).&#13;
&#13;
That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked&#13;
&#13;
When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and
only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an
NMI.  KVM&amp;amp;apos;s ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM&amp;amp;apos;s point of
view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other.  When using vNMI, KVM pends
the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the
rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).&#13;
&#13;
However, if KVM can&amp;amp;apos;t immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is
in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI
window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).&#13;
&#13;
Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of
KVM&amp;amp;apos;s behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real
hardware as possible.  E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the
probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low
on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g.
if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow.  For GIF=0, the argument isn&amp;amp;apos;t
as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger
in bare metal (though still small).&#13;
&#13;
That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-2522</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2024-50164</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-50164</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 141 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix overloading of MEM_UNINIT&amp;#39;s meaning Lonial reported an issue in the BPF verifier where check_mem_size_reg() has the following code:     if (!tnum_is_const(reg-&amp;gt;var_off))         /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw          * mode so that the program is required to          * initialize all the memory that the helper could          * just partially fill up.          */          meta = NULL; This means that writes are not checked when the register containing the size of the passed buffer has not a fixed size. Through this bug, a BPF program can write to a map which is marked as read-only, for example, .rodata global maps. The problem is that MEM_UNINIT&amp;#39;s initial meaning that &amp;#34;the passed buffer to the BPF helper does not need to be initialized&amp;#34; which was added back in commit 435faee1aae9 (&amp;#34;bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type&amp;#34;) got overloaded over time with &amp;#34;the passed buffer is being written to&amp;#34;. The problem however is that checks such as the above which were added later via 06c1c049721a (&amp;#34;bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory&amp;#34;) set meta to NULL in order force the user to always initialize the passed buffer to the helper. Due to the current double meaning of MEM_UNINIT, this bypasses verifier write checks to the memory (not boundary checks though) and only assumes the latter memory is read instead. Fix this by reverting MEM_UNINIT back to its original meaning, and having…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 141 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix overloading of MEM_UNINIT&amp;#39;s meaning Lonial reported an issue in the BPF verifier where check_mem_size_reg() has the following code:     if (!tnum_is_const(reg-&amp;gt;var_off))         /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw          * mode so that the program is required to          * initialize all the memory that the helper could          * just partially fill up.          */          meta = NULL; This means that writes are not checked when the register containing the size of the passed buffer has not a fixed size. Through this bug, a BPF program can write to a map which is marked as read-only, for example, .rodata global maps. The problem is that MEM_UNINIT&amp;#39;s initial meaning that &amp;#34;the passed buffer to the BPF helper does not need to be initialized&amp;#34; which was added back in commit 435faee1aae9 (&amp;#34;bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type&amp;#34;) got overloaded over time with &amp;#34;the passed buffer is being written to&amp;#34;. The problem however is that checks such as the above which were added later via 06c1c049721a (&amp;#34;bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory&amp;#34;) set meta to NULL in order force the user to always initialize the passed buffer to the helper. Due to the current double meaning of MEM_UNINIT, this bypasses verifier write checks to the memory (not boundary checks though) and only assumes the latter memory is read instead. Fix this by reverting MEM_UNINIT back to its original meaning, and having…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-50164</guid>
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