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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 01:05:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>BELL-CVE-2024-47740</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-47740</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-47740</guid>
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      <title>certfr-2024-avi-1101 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-1101</link>
      <description>certfr-2024-avi-1101</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-1101</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2024-2522 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-2522</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked&#13;
&#13;
When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and
only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an
NMI.  KVM&amp;amp;apos;s ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM&amp;amp;apos;s point of
view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other.  When using vNMI, KVM pends
the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the
rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).&#13;
&#13;
However, if KVM can&amp;amp;apos;t immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is
in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI
window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).&#13;
&#13;
Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of
KVM&amp;amp;apos;s behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real
hardware as possible.  E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the
probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low
on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g.
if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow.  For GIF=0, the argument isn&amp;amp;apos;t
as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger
in bare metal (though still small).&#13;
&#13;
That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked&#13;
&#13;
When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and
only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an
NMI.  KVM&amp;amp;apos;s ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM&amp;amp;apos;s point of
view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other.  When using vNMI, KVM pends
the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the
rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).&#13;
&#13;
However, if KVM can&amp;amp;apos;t immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is
in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI
window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).&#13;
&#13;
Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of
KVM&amp;amp;apos;s behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real
hardware as possible.  E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the
probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low
on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g.
if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow.  For GIF=0, the argument isn&amp;amp;apos;t
as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger
in bare metal (though still small).&#13;
&#13;
That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-2522</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2024-47740</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-47740</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 192 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller&amp;#39;s FSUID matches the inode&amp;#39;s UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:  - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can    truncate an inode to size 0  - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert    changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 192 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller&amp;#39;s FSUID matches the inode&amp;#39;s UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:  - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can    truncate an inode to size 0  - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert    changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-47740</guid>
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