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    <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 04:06:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2024-39488</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-39488</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/bell-cve-2024-39488</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>certfr-2024-avi-0613 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-0613</link>
      <description>certfr-2024-avi-0613</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-0613</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OESA-2024-1860 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-1860</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests&#13;
&#13;
The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice
on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the
work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution
background request cannot be active twice.&#13;
&#13;
       CPU 1                                  CPU 2&#13;
&#13;
rdma_resolve_addr():
  RDMA_CM_IDLE -&amp;amp;gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)  #1&#13;
&#13;
			 process_one_req(): for #1
                          addr_handler():
                            RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -&amp;amp;gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND
                            mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;amp;id_priv-&amp;amp;gt;handler_mutex);
                            [.. handler still running ..]&#13;
&#13;
rdma_resolve_addr():
  RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -&amp;amp;gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)
    !! two requests are now on the req_list&#13;
&#13;
rdma_destroy_id():
 destroy_id_handler_unlock():
  _destroy_id():
   cma_cancel_operation():
    rdma_addr_cancel()&#13;
&#13;
                          // process_one_req() self removes it
		          spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;amp;lock);
                           cancel_delayed_work(&amp;amp;amp;req-&amp;amp;gt;work);
	                   if (!list_empty(&amp;amp;amp;req-&amp;amp;gt;list)) == true&#13;
&#13;
      ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done&#13;
&#13;
   kfree(id_priv…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&#13;
&#13;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests&#13;
&#13;
The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice
on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the
work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution
background request cannot be active twice.&#13;
&#13;
       CPU 1                                  CPU 2&#13;
&#13;
rdma_resolve_addr():
  RDMA_CM_IDLE -&amp;amp;gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)  #1&#13;
&#13;
			 process_one_req(): for #1
                          addr_handler():
                            RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -&amp;amp;gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND
                            mutex_unlock(&amp;amp;amp;id_priv-&amp;amp;gt;handler_mutex);
                            [.. handler still running ..]&#13;
&#13;
rdma_resolve_addr():
  RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -&amp;amp;gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)
    !! two requests are now on the req_list&#13;
&#13;
rdma_destroy_id():
 destroy_id_handler_unlock():
  _destroy_id():
   cma_cancel_operation():
    rdma_addr_cancel()&#13;
&#13;
                          // process_one_req() self removes it
		          spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;amp;lock);
                           cancel_delayed_work(&amp;amp;amp;req-&amp;amp;gt;work);
	                   if (!list_empty(&amp;amp;amp;req-&amp;amp;gt;list)) == true&#13;
&#13;
      ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done&#13;
&#13;
   kfree(id_priv…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/oesa-2024-1860</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2024-39488</title>
      <link>https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-39488</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 140 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior entries in the table will be handled correctly. The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct are suitably aligned within arrays. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is: 	struct bug_entry { 		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes 		signed int      file_disp;	// 4 bytes 		unsigned short  line;		// 2 bytes 		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes 	} ... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is: 	struct bug_entry { 		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes 		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes 		&amp;lt; implicit padding &amp;gt;		// 2 bytes 	} ... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing padding, requiring 4-byte alginment. When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries. However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding bytes. For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn&amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 140 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior entries in the table will be handled correctly. The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct are suitably aligned within arrays. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is: 	struct bug_entry { 		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes 		signed int      file_disp;	// 4 bytes 		unsigned short  line;		// 2 bytes 		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes 	} ... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is: 	struct bug_entry { 		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes 		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes 		&amp;lt; implicit padding &amp;gt;		// 2 bytes 	} ... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing padding, requiring 4-byte alginment. When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries. However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding bytes. For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn&amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://127.0.0.1:10001/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2024-39488</guid>
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