Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-91
Allowed-with-ReviewXML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in XML, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the XML before it is processed by an end system.
82 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
CVE-2026-83607 (GCVE-0-2026-83607)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-01 14:23 – Updated: 2026-09-01 15:28
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
xmldom: Element name injection via createElement() bypasses requireWellFormed
Summary
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createElement(tagName) stores an unvalidated element name and XMLSerializer.serializeToString() emits that name verbatim. The requireWellFormed: true path did not validate the element qualified name or synthesized xmlns:PREFIX declaration, so attacker-controlled tag names could inject attributes, elements, or processing instructions into serialized XML or HTML and could cause cross-site scripting when browser-consumed. The unchecked values violate the XML QName constraint, and default serialization and creation-time createElement() behavior remain permissive. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11; no fixed version is available for xmldom.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-01 15:28 UTC
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Assigner
GitHub_M
CNA
References
7 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisor… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1043 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1050 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/cba132121… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/d8212e632… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.14 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.11 | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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CVE-2026-83605 (GCVE-0-2026-83605)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-01 14:18 – Updated: 2026-09-03 17:35
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
xmldom: Attribute name injection via setAttribute() bypasses requireWellFormed
Summary
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Element.setAttribute() calls the private _createAttribute(name) path without validating the attribute name, while Document.createAttribute(name) validates against QName. XMLSerializer.serializeToString() emits attribute names verbatim, and requireWellFormed: true did not validate them, so a crafted name can terminate the intended attribute and inject additional attributes, including event handlers, into browser-consumed output; synthesized xmlns:PREFIX declarations expose the same unchecked-name boundary. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11; no fixed version is available for xmldom.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-03 17:35 UTC
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Assigner
GitHub_M
CNA
References
7 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisor… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1043 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1050 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/cba132121… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/d8212e632… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.14 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.11 | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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CVE-2026-76979 (GCVE-0-2026-76979)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-23 12:22 – Updated: 2026-09-23 16:46
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
XML Injection vulnerability
Summary
ZohoCorp ManageEngine OpManager and Firewall Analyzer versions 12.8.709 and below were vulnerable to an XML Injection vulnerability in the Rule Tracking Compare Policies feature.
Severity
7.7 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 13:01 UTC
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML injection (aka blind XPath injection)
Assigner
Zohocorp
CNA
References
1 reference
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zohocorp | ManageEngine OpManager |
Affected:
0 , < 12.8.710
(custom)
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_opmanager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| ZohoCorp | ManageEngine Firewall Analyzer |
Affected:
0 , < 12.8.710
(custom)
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_firewall_analyzer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-66295 (GCVE-0-2026-66295)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-06 10:16 – Updated: 2026-11-06 10:16
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Processing instruction target and content emitted unescaped in Saxy encoder allows XML injection
Summary
Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.
Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.
The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection
Assigner
EEF
CNA
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66295.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66295 | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e94078… | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/4aeb80e2acc31… | patch |
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:processing_instruction/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.7.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.7.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "qcam/saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/qcam/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:processing_instruction/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe application must serialize a document containing a processing instruction whose target or content is derived from untrusted input, by passing a \u003ccode\u003e{:processing_instruction, name, content}\u003c/code\u003e node (typically built with \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.processing_instruction/2\u003c/code\u003e) to \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode!/2\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode_to_iodata!/2\u003c/code\u003e. Applications that never place dynamic data in processing instructions are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "The application must serialize a document containing a processing instruction whose target or content is derived from untrusted input, by passing a `{:processing_instruction, name, content}` node (typically built with `Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2`) to `Saxy.encode!/2` or `Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2`. Applications that never place dynamic data in processing instructions are not affected."
}
],
"value": "The application must serialize a document containing a processing instruction whose target or content is derived from untrusted input, by passing a {:processing_instruction, name, content} node (typically built with Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2) to Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2. Applications that never place dynamic data in processing instructions are not affected."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.7.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.7.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation reviewer",
"value": "C\u1ea9m Hu\u1ef3nh"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eSaxy\u0027s XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;?\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e?\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBecause \u003ccode\u003e?\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;?\u003c/code\u003e keeps the encoder\u0027s own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML \u003ccode\u003eName\u003c/code\u003e production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.processing_instruction/2\u003c/code\u003e is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Saxy\u0027s XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between `\u003c?` and `?\u003e`, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.\n\nBecause `?\u003e` terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching `\u003c?` keeps the encoder\u0027s own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML `Name` production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.\n\nThe result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since `Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2` is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"value": "Saxy\u0027s XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between \u003c? and ?\u003e, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.\n\nBecause ?\u003e terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching \u003c? keeps the encoder\u0027s own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.\n\nThe result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-250",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-250 XML Injection"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-91",
"description": "CWE-91 XML Injection",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:45.577Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-f9r9-vrxq-g566"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-66295",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66295.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-66295",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66295"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 7266632 in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 4aeb80e in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Processing instruction target and content emitted unescaped in Saxy encoder allows XML injection",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eDo not place untrusted data in processing instructions. Where a dynamic value is unavoidable, validate it before building the node: reject any content containing \u003ccode\u003e?\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e, and reject any target that does not match the XML \u003ccode\u003eName\u003c/code\u003e production or that equals \u003ccode\u003exml\u003c/code\u003e case-insensitively. Alternatively, carry the value in element content or an attribute instead, both of which the encoder escapes.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Do not place untrusted data in processing instructions. Where a dynamic value is unavoidable, validate it before building the node: reject any content containing `?\u003e`, and reject any target that does not match the XML `Name` production or that equals `xml` case-insensitively. Alternatively, carry the value in element content or an attribute instead, both of which the encoder escapes."
}
],
"value": "Do not place untrusted data in processing instructions. Where a dynamic value is unavoidable, validate it before building the node: reject any content containing ?\u003e, and reject any target that does not match the XML Name production or that equals xml case-insensitively. Alternatively, carry the value in element content or an attribute instead, both of which the encoder escapes."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-66295",
"datePublished": "2026-11-06T10:16:45.577Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-24T14:10:01.114Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:45.577Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-66294 (GCVE-0-2026-66294)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-06 10:16 – Updated: 2026-11-06 10:16
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
XML injection in Saxy via unescaped CDATA section terminator
Summary
XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between <![CDATA[ and ]]> and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters <, >, &, ", and ', but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]> substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]><![CDATA[>. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.
An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]> is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection
Assigner
EEF
CNA
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66294.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66294 | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e94078… | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/71d99fae12f1d… | patch |
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:cdata/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:cdata/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.7.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.7.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "qcam/saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/qcam/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:cdata/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:cdata/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.7.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.7.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation reviewer",
"value": "C\u1ea9m Hu\u1ef3nh"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eXML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.Encoder.cdata/1\u003c/code\u003e serializes a \u003ccode\u003e{:cdata, characters}\u003c/code\u003e node by wrapping the supplied characters between \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;![CDATA[\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder\u0027s character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\u0026amp;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\"\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003e\u0027\u003c/code\u003e, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e substring is to split the section and rejoin it as \u003ccode\u003e]]]]\u0026gt;\u0026lt;![CDATA[\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.cdata/1\u003c/code\u003e and serializing it with \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode!/2\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode_to_iodata!/2\u003c/code\u003e, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. `Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1` serializes a `{:cdata, characters}` node by wrapping the supplied characters between `\u003c![CDATA[` and `]]\u003e` and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder\u0027s character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `\u0026`, `\"`, and `\u0027`, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a `]]\u003e` substring is to split the section and rejoin it as `]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e`. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.\n\nAn application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with `Saxy.XML.cdata/1` and serializing it with `Saxy.encode!/2` or `Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2`, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the `]]\u003e` is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"value": "XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between \u003c![CDATA[ and ]]\u003e and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder\u0027s character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters \u003c, \u003e, \u0026, \", and \u0027, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]\u003e substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.\n\nAn application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]\u003e is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-250",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-250 XML Injection"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-91",
"description": "CWE-91 XML Injection",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:49.656Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-hq6g-j46w-wx72"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-66294",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66294.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-66294",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66294"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 7266632 in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 71d99fa in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "XML injection in Saxy via unescaped CDATA section terminator",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eRender untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.characters/1\u003c/code\u003e to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e in the untrusted text with \u003ccode\u003e]]]]\u0026gt;\u0026lt;![CDATA[\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e and pass the result to \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.cdata/1\u003c/code\u003e. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Render untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or `Saxy.XML.characters/1` to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content.\n\nIf a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of `]]\u003e` in the untrusted text with `]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e` and pass the result to `Saxy.XML.cdata/1`. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding."
}
],
"value": "Render untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or Saxy.XML.characters/1 to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content.\n\nIf a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of ]]\u003e in the untrusted text with ]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e and pass the result to Saxy.XML.cdata/1. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-66294",
"datePublished": "2026-11-06T10:16:49.656Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-24T14:10:01.114Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:49.656Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-66293 (GCVE-0-2026-66293)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-06 10:16 – Updated: 2026-11-06 10:16
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
XML comment injection in Saxy encoder via unescaped double hyphen
Summary
XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the <!-- and --> delimiters.
When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection
Assigner
EEF
CNA
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66293.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66293 | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e94078… | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/6d12ee12b9e32… | patch |
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:comment/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.7.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.7.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "qcam/saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/qcam/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:comment/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "6d12ee12b9e32e86ef598b3f3cafccd1840b2f41",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly applications that place untrusted text into an XML comment node are affected. The untrusted value must reach \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.comment/1\u003c/code\u003e or a raw \u003ccode\u003e{:comment, text}\u003c/code\u003e simple form child that is then serialized with \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode!/2\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode_to_iodata!/2\u003c/code\u003e. Documents that are only parsed by Saxy never reach the encoder and are not a vector.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Only applications that place untrusted text into an XML comment node are affected. The untrusted value must reach `Saxy.XML.comment/1` or a raw `{:comment, text}` simple form child that is then serialized with `Saxy.encode!/2` or `Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2`. Documents that are only parsed by Saxy never reach the encoder and are not a vector."
}
],
"value": "Only applications that place untrusted text into an XML comment node are affected. The untrusted value must reach Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child that is then serialized with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2. Documents that are only parsed by Saxy never reach the encoder and are not a vector."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.7.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.7.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation reviewer",
"value": "C\u1ea9m Hu\u1ef3nh"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eXML injection in the encoder of Saxy. \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.Encoder\u003c/code\u003e does not neutralize the \u003ccode\u003e--\u003c/code\u003e sequence in XML comment content: \u003ccode\u003eescape_comment/2\u003c/code\u003e returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single \u003ccode\u003e-\u003c/code\u003e, so neither an interior \u003ccode\u003e--\u003c/code\u003e nor a full \u003ccode\u003e--\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;!--\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e--\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e delimiters.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.comment/1\u003c/code\u003e or a raw \u003ccode\u003e{:comment, text}\u003c/code\u003e simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with \u003ccode\u003e--\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. `Saxy.Encoder` does not neutralize the `--` sequence in XML comment content: `escape_comment/2` returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single `-`, so neither an interior `--` nor a full `--\u003e` is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the `\u003c!--` and `--\u003e` delimiters.\n\nWhen an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through `Saxy.XML.comment/1` or a raw `{:comment, text}` simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with `--\u003e` and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"value": "XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --\u003e is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the \u003c!-- and --\u003e delimiters.\n\nWhen an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --\u003e and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-250",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-250 XML Injection"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-91",
"description": "CWE-91 XML Injection",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:42.053Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-mm3m-xwmf-v698"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-66293",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66293.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-66293",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66293"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 7266632 in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 6d12ee1 in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/6d12ee12b9e32e86ef598b3f3cafccd1840b2f41"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "XML comment injection in Saxy encoder via unescaped double hyphen",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eReject or rewrite the \u003ccode\u003e--\u003c/code\u003e sequence in untrusted text before passing it to \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.comment/1\u003c/code\u003e, for example by replacing \u003ccode\u003e--\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003e- -\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAlternatively, stop emitting untrusted data as XML comments. Comments carry no semantic payload for consumers, so the text can usually be moved into an element or a CDATA section instead.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Reject or rewrite the `--` sequence in untrusted text before passing it to `Saxy.XML.comment/1`, for example by replacing `--` with `- -`.\n\nAlternatively, stop emitting untrusted data as XML comments. Comments carry no semantic payload for consumers, so the text can usually be moved into an element or a CDATA section instead."
}
],
"value": "Reject or rewrite the -- sequence in untrusted text before passing it to Saxy.XML.comment/1, for example by replacing -- with - -.\n\nAlternatively, stop emitting untrusted data as XML comments. Comments carry no semantic payload for consumers, so the text can usually be moved into an element or a CDATA section instead."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-66293",
"datePublished": "2026-11-06T10:16:42.053Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-24T14:10:01.114Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:42.053Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-65124 (GCVE-0-2026-65124)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-22 14:10 – Updated: 2026-09-22 15:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an XML injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to data tampering and denial of service.
Severity
5.9 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-22 15:27 UTC
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Assigner
nvidia
CNA
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| NVIDIA | Infrastructure Controller |
Affected:
0 to 1.9
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-65124",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-22T15:27:07.955136Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T15:27:16.923Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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CVE-2026-59728 (GCVE-0-2026-59728)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-27 19:54 – Updated: 2026-07-28 14:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
@astrojs/rss: XML Injection via Unescaped RSS Feed Fields
Summary
Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. In versions 1.0.0 through 4.0.18, the source.title and enclosure.type item fields in packages/astro-rss/src/index.ts are interpolated directly into XML template strings without XML-character escaping before being parsed by fast-xml-parser. Both fields are validated only as z.string(), placing no restriction on XML special characters. An attacker who controls these values can inject arbitrary XML into the generated RSS feed: a value containing " can break out of an attribute (as with enclosure.type), and a value containing </source> can close an element early and inject additional nodes (as with source.title). This corrupts feed structure, injects false metadata (for example, a fake <link> pointing to a malicious URL), and can cause feed readers to misparse or display attacker-controlled content. In SSR mode (output: 'server'), the poisoned feed is served on every request to all subscribers. This issue has been fixed in version 4.0.19.
Severity
4.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-28 14:27 UTC
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Assigner
GitHub_M
CNA
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advis… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17209 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/fbcfa03… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/@… | x_refsource_MISC |
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CVE-2026-55789 (GCVE-0-2026-55789)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-10 19:55 – Updated: 2026-07-13 18:16
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Logto: SAML IdP injects user-controlled profile attributes raw into signed assertions, allowing privilege escalation at relying Service Providers
Summary
Logto is the modern, open-source auth infrastructure for SaaS and AI apps. Prior to 1.41.0, Logto's self-hosted SAML application IdP built the signed SAML response and assertion by string-substituting user-controlled profile attributes such as name, email, and custom attribute-mapping values into element-text placeholders of a SAML XML template using samlify 2.10.0, which left those placeholders unescaped. An authenticated low-privilege user could place XML markup in a profile attribute so Logto signed a forged SAML attribute, such as an arbitrary role, allowing privilege escalation at relying Service Providers that authorize on SAML attributes. This issue is fixed in version 1.41.0.
Severity
8.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-13 18:16 UTC
CWE
Assigner
GitHub_M
CNA
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/logto-io/logto/security/adviso… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/logto-io/logto/pull/9107 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/logto-io/logto/commit/90970548… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/logto-io/logto/releases/tag/v1.41.0 | x_refsource_MISC |
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CVE-2026-53723 (GCVE-0-2026-53723)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-11 12:42 – Updated: 2026-06-11 16:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
guzzlehttp/guzzle-services' XML Request Serialization Vulnerable to XML Injection via CDATA Terminator
Summary
Guzzle Services provides an implementation of the Guzzle Command library that uses Guzzle service descriptions to describe web services, serialize requests, and parse responses into easy to use model structures. Versions prior ro 1.5.4 do not safely serialize scalar XML element values containing the CDATA terminator `]]>`. The XML request serializer writes values containing `<`, `>`, or `&` with `XMLWriter::writeCData($value)`. If attacker-controlled input contains `]]>`, the CDATA section closes early and the remainder is interpreted as XML markup. This is an outgoing request-body integrity issue, not a response parsing issue. The attacker does not need to control the service description or schema. Users are affected when all of the following are true: the application uses `guzzlehttp/guzzle-services` to serialize outgoing requests; a request parameter or `additionalParameters` schema uses `location: xml`; the value is serialized as XML element text, not an XML attribute; the value can contain attacker-controlled, user-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted input; the value is not constrained by a safe `enum`, `pattern`, or custom filter that excludes `]]>`; and the downstream service parses the generated XML structurally and may act on unexpected, duplicated, or injected elements. Applications that serialize untrusted input into `location: xml` request parameters can emit XML containing attacker-controlled elements outside the intended text node. Depending on the receiving service, this can alter operation semantics, smuggle privileged fields, bypass modeled parameter boundaries, or create conflicting duplicated elements. Fixed service descriptions are sufficient if they contain an XML element parameter populated from attacker-controlled input. Users are not directly affected if they only use Guzzle Services to deserialize HTTP response bodies. Response XML parsing uses the response XML location visitor and does not invoke the vulnerable request XML serializer. Response bodies matter only in a second-order flow, such as parsing attacker-controlled response XML, storing or forwarding a parsed string value, and later using it as a `location: xml` request parameter. The issue is patched in `1.5.3` and later by safely splitting embedded CDATA terminators before serialization. The fix preserves the original scalar value as XML text and prevents injected nodes. As a workaround, constrain attacker-controlled XML element values with a strict `enum`, `pattern`, or custom filter that excludes `]]>`, or avoid serializing untrusted data into `location: xml` element text until patched. Where appropriate for the service schema, XML attributes are not affected because they are written with XMLWriter attribute APIs rather than CDATA sections. To determine whether action is needed, search service descriptions for request parameters using `location: xml`, including operation `parameters` and `additionalParameters`. Response-only `models` are not directly affected unless parsed values are reused for request serialization. For object and array parameters, review nested scalar properties because leaf element values can still be affected.
Severity
5.8 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-11 15:57 UTC
Assigner
GitHub_M
CNA
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle-services/securit… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| guzzle | guzzle-services |
Affected:
< 1.5.4
|
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"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-53723",
"datePublished": "2026-06-11T12:42:42.919Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-10T16:43:31.242Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-11T16:13:18.490Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
CAPEC-250: XML Injection
An attacker utilizes crafted XML user-controllable input to probe, attack, and inject data into the XML database, using techniques similar to SQL injection. The user-controllable input can allow for unauthorized viewing of data, bypassing authentication or the front-end application for direct XML database access, and possibly altering database information.
CAPEC-83: XPath Injection
An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of XPath expressions to inject the XML database and bypass authentication or glean information that they normally would not be able to. XPath Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the XML database, thus bypassing the application completely. XPath Injection results from the failure of an application to properly sanitize input used as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to query an XML database.